Action Plan for National Resilience 2014

June 3, 2014

National Resilience Promotion Headquarters

Chapter 1:
Characterization and Structure of the Action Plan for National Resilience

1. Significance of the Action Plan for National Resilience

In order to steadily promote the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience (hereinafter referred to as the “Fundamental Plan”), which stipulates promotion policies for each sector of measures for about five years, it is extremely important to ascertain the progress of individual measures as quantitatively as possible for the evaluation of the progress of each program across relevant ministries and agencies every fiscal year and to manage the progress of programs by establishing and implementing specific measures to be prioritized in the coming year (including measures for collaboration among ministries and agencies covering multiple individual measures).

Therefore, the Action Plan for National Resilience (hereinafter referred to as the “Action Plan”) is hereby established to clarify the details of the vulnerability assessment for respective programs, plans for promoting respective programs and major measures for promoting relevant programs. The Action Plan is to be reviewed every fiscal year through the evaluation of the progress of each program across relevant ministries and agencies.

For the quantitative evaluation of the progress of individual measures, the government sets key performance indicators and other specific numerical indicators and constantly reviews such indicators in response to changes in circumstances. In that process, the utmost efforts should be made to ascertain the latest situations and set the same target year to the extent possible.

The table below shows the following specified in the Fundamental Plan:

  1. Four fundamental goals against the occurrence of disasters;
  2. Eight goals to be achieved in advance in preparation for large-scale natural disasters;
  3. 45 worst events that should never happen, which may hinder the achievement of the eight goals; and
  4. 15 events selected, out of the 45 worst events that should never happen, as those for which measures should be taken intensively, in light of the significance of the national government’s role and the seriousness of the influence and degree of urgency.

The Worst Events that should Never Happen
Fundamental goals Goals to be achieved in advance   Worst events that should never happen
  1. Prevent human loss by any means.
  2. Avoid fatal damage to important functions for maintaining administration as well as social and economic systems.
  3. Mitigate damage to property and facilities and prevent expansion of damage.
  4. Achieve swift recovery and reconstruction.
1 Protect human lives to the utmost extent even in the event of a large-scale natural disaster. 1-1 Casualties due to large-scale and multiple collapse of buildings and transportation facilities in urban areas or fires in densely-populated areas.
1-2 Collapse of and fires at facilities used by the general public.
1-3 Extensive human loss due to a wide area large-scale tsunami, etc.
1-4 Prolonged and wide-area flooding in urban areas due to abnormal weather, etc.
1-5 A large number of casualties due to a large-scale volcanic eruption or sediment disaster (deep-seated landslide), etc., which may also increase vulnerability of national land over years to come
1-6 A large number of casualties due to delay in evacuation caused by failure of information transmission, etc.
2 Ensure prompt rescue and first-aid activities and provision of medical care from immediately after a large-scale natural disaster (including responses required in the absence of such activities). 2-1 Prolonged suspension of supply of food, drinking water and other vital goods
2-2 Concurrent occurrence of isolation of many villages for long periods
2-3 Absolute lack of rescue and emergency activities due to damage to the self-defense forces, the police, fire services, the Japan Coast Guard, etc.
2-4 Prolonged suspension of energy supply for rescue/emergency activities and medical
2-5 Shortage of food and drinking water, etc. caused by the number of people stranded due to a disaster and the length of time beyond expectations
2-6 Paralysis of medical services due to damage to and/or severe lack of medical facilities and personnel, and disruption of routes for offering support
2-7 Outbreak of plagues or infectious diseases on a large scale in disaster-affected areas
3 Secure indispensable administrative functions from immediately after a large-scale natural disaster. 3-1 A decline in public safety due to escape of inmates from correctional facilities and a significant deterioration of the functions of local police due to damage
3-2 Frequent serious traffic accidents due to traffic light failures, etc.
3-3 Dysfunction of the central government in the capital region
3-4 Significant deterioration of the functions of local governments due to damage to personnel and facilities
4 Secure indispensable information communication functions from immediately after a large-scale natural disaster. 4-1 Paralysis and prolonged suspension of information transmission due to suspension of power supply, etc.
4-2 Circumstances where various important mail is left undelivered due to prolonged suspension of postal services
4-3 Circumstances where disaster information cannot be delivered to people who need it due to suspension of TV and radio broadcasting
5 Prevent functional disturbance in economic activities (including supply chains) even after the occurrence of a large-scale natural disaster. 5-1 Loss of international competitiveness due to a decline in companies’ productivity caused by disruption of supply chains, etc.
5-2 Suspension of energy supply necessary for social economic activities and the maintenance of supply chains
5-3 Damage to and fires or explosions, etc. at complexes and other important industrial facilities
5-4 Significant influence on overseas trade due to suspension of maritime transport functions
5-5 Dysfunction of the core road/marine transport networks, such as disruption of arteries in the Pacific Belt Zone
5-6 Concurrent damage to multiple airports
5-7 Circumstances where dysfunction of financial services exerts tremendous influence on commercial transactions
5-8 Stagnation of stable supply of food, etc.
6 Secure minimum networks for electricity, gas, water and sewerage, fuel and transport required for people’s lives and economic activities even after the occurrence of a large-scale natural disaster, and seek early recovery of these networks. 6-1 Suspension of functions of power supply networks (power generating/transforming stations, transmission/distribution equipment) and oil/LP gas supply chains
6-2 Prolonged suspension of water supply, etc.
6-3 Prolonged suspension of functions of sewage treatment facilities, etc.
6-4 Circumstances where local transport networks are disrupted
6-5 Disruption of supply of water for specific uses due to drought, etc.
7 Prevent any uncontrollable second disaster. 7-1 Outbreak of large-scale fires in urban areas
7-2 Occurrence of an extensive complex disaster on the sea or in coastal areas
7-3 Direct damage and traffic paralysis due to collapse of buildings along railroads and roads
7-4 Occurrence of a secondary disaster due to damage to and functional failure of reservoirs, dams, disaster prevention facilities, natural dams, etc.
7-5 Large-scale spread and leakage of hazardous materials
7-6 Expansion of damage due to devastation of farmland and forests
7-7 Tremendous influence on the national economy, etc. due to harmful rumors
8 Develop conditions that enable swift recovery and reconstruction of local society and economy even after the occurrence of a large-scale natural disaster. 8-1 Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to delay in treatment of a large amount of disaster waste
8-2 Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to shortage of personnel in charge of opening of access routes or other recovery/reconstruction-related activities (experts, coordinators, workers, engineers well versed in respective regions, etc.)
8-3 Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to collapse of local communities and a decline in public safety
8-4 Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to damage to the Shinkansen and other core infrastructure
8-5 Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to extensive and prolonged flooding due to ground subsidence in broad areas
* Shadowed events are the worst ones pertaining to programs to be prioritized.

2. Structure of the Action Plan

(1) Vulnerability Assessment for Respective Programs

From the perspective of avoiding the worst events that should never happen, key performance indicators shall be set for properly ascertaining the achievement level and progress of each program, based on which assessment shall be conducted each fiscal year for respective programs with regard to specific measures having been taken.

As key performance indicators are significant means for ascertaining the achievement level and progress of each program, the details thereof must be reviewed on an ongoing basis to review vulnerability assessment methods and further improve accuracy and make adjustments in response to changes in circumstances.

(2) Plans for Promoting Respective Programs

Programs were set up with the aim of organizing various measures taken by relevant ministries and agencies every year in a cross-sectoral manner for each of the worst events that should never happen. The worst events that should never happen are specific events that may be caused by a large-scale natural disaster, and it is very important to draw up promotion policies for each program based on a vulnerability assessment and have relevant ministries and agencies carry out measures promptly in close collaboration.

When planning and promoting individual measures for every fiscal year, the key is to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency from a cross-sectoral perspective to avoid the worst events that should never happen, additionally from the viewpoint of each ministry and agency in charge of each sector. Therefore, the national government will draw up plans for promoting respective programs every fiscal year based on the results of the vulnerability assessment mentioned in (1) above.

(3) Major Measures for Promoting Programs

Major measures to be taken for promoting programs to avoid the worst events that should never happen are to be compiled for each sector of measures. These measures shall also be reviewed continuously every fiscal year in accordance with new collaboration among different sectors of measures and the progress in respective measures and programs.

Chapter 2:
Vulnerability Assessment for Respective Programs

The results of vulnerability assessment for respective programs conducted as of March 2014 and key performance indicators referred to in that process are as shown in the Attachment.

Chapter 3:
Plans for Promoting Respective Programs

The following are the plans for promoting respective programs, which were established based on the results of the vulnerability assessment for respective programs as compiled in Chapter 2.

As programs are cross-sectoral and are expected to produce better effects when promoted by collaboration among multiple ministries and agencies, due consideration should be given to ensure effectiveness and efficiency in achieving goals set up in the promotion plans, while seeking the understanding and cooperation of local governments and having relevant parties share data concerning key performance indicators and other specific numerical indicators.

In light of the significance of the 15 programs to be prioritized (programs with an asterisk), intensive efforts should be made therefor in particular for earlier achievement and further sophistication of goals, with full attention paid to the progress and embodiment of measures by the relevant ministries and agencies.

1. Protect human lives to the utmost extent even in the event of a large-scale natural disaster

*1-1) Casualties due to large-scale and multiple collapse of buildings and transportation facilities in urban areas or fires in densely-populated areas

  • In order to improve the earthquake resistance of houses and buildings, detailed measures including reconstruction of aged condominiums should be promoted to achieve the goals. Anti-seismic measures for non-structural members, such as suspended ceilings, should also be promoted. Measures to ensure structural safety of high-rise buildings, which are susceptible to long-period ground motions, also need to be taken.
  • Seismic reinforcement work for traffic facilities and buildings along roads and railroads is to be promoted. Research and technological development should be steadily carried out from a long-term perspective with regard to effects of long lasting and long-period ground motions on traffic facilities, new structural materials, and technologies for inspecting and checking the aging of facilities.
  • Measures for power poles as well as facilities and structures built on large-scale reclaimed land, etc., which are damaged easily in the event of a large-scale earthquake, should be put in place and efforts should also be made to improve the safety of underground malls.
  • Initiatives for preventing fires and mitigating damage are to be facilitated. The public and private sectors should cooperate with each other in efforts for the improvement and development of densely-populated urban areas (5,745 ha) with extremely high risks of large-scale fires in the event of an earthquake. The improvement projects should be achieved in a planned manner by such means as developing evacuation sites and increasing anti-fire buildings. Even after achieving the initial goals, efforts should be continued to further improve such densely-populated urban areas from a medium- to long-term perspective.
  • Discussions should be held on means to solve the problem of expected overall insufficiency of the rescue and emergency systems for protecting human lives from large-scale earthquakes or fires.
  • Temporary housing should be secured for accommodating a large number of people who are stranded and are unable to return home after the occurrence of a disaster.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)] Proportion of houses and buildings with seismic resistance:

Houses: Approx. 79% (2008) → 95% (2020)

Buildings: Approx. 80% (2008) → 90% (2015)

[MLIT] Elimination of power poles along arterial roads in city centers, etc.: 15% (2012) → 18% (2016)

[MLIT] Proportion of major rail lines with seismic resistance in areas where a seismic intensity of 6 upper is envisaged in the event of a capital inland earthquake or a Nankai Trough earthquake: 91% (2012) → Almost 100% (2017)

[MLIT] Publication of maps of large-scale reclaimed land: Approx. 4% (2013) → Approx. 50% (2016)

[MLIT] Underground malls where efforts have been commenced based on a disaster prevention plan: 0% (2013) → 100% (2018)

[MLIT] Area within densely-populated urban areas with extremely high risks in the event of an earthquake where the congestion has been resolved: 0 ha (2013) → 5,745 ha (2020)

1-2) Collapse of and fires at facilities used by the general public

  • Efforts for enhancing the earthquake resistance of school facilities (including non-structural members, such as suspended ceilings, and essential utilities) should be strengthened, aiming to complete the work as early as possible (for public school facilities by FY2015, and work will be conducted for private school facilities taking the progress of the work for public school facilities into consideration ).
  • Anti-seismic measures should be taken steadily for medical facilities, financial institutions, post offices, traffic-related facilities, gymnasiums, public halls, and cultural assets, etc.
  • In order to improve rescue and emergency activities onsite, communication infrastructure and facilities should be made more resilient and sophisticated, and the rescue system and equipment and the training environment should be further improved and developed.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Proportion of buildings with seismic resistance: Approx. 80% (2008) → 90% (2015) (mentioned above)

[Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)] Proportion of core disaster hospitals and rescue centers nationwide with seismic resistance: 73% (2012) → 81.2% (2014)

[MHLW] Proportion of social welfare facilities with seismic resistance: 84% (2012) → 94.5% (2018)

*1-3) Extensive human loss due to a wide area large-scale tsunami, etc.

  • Steady efforts should be made for creating communities resilient to tsunamis, taking anti-seismic measures for shelters to improve regional disaster prevention capabilities, developing the J-ALERT system to ensure proper provision of disaster information to local residents, and preventing possible fires and accidents involving dangerous goods.
  • Construction of coastal dikes, etc. up to the planned height and seismic reinforcement work should be carried out steadily in a planned manner in areas with a high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake.
  • Related organizations should cooperatively promote structural measures combined with non-structural measures, such as the development of the system for cautious evacuation. For example, they should discuss levels of required protective measures, integrating structural and non-structural countermeasures against low-frequency large-scale tsunamis, for ports in the metropolitan bay area, where the population and essential functions are concentrated, or for fishing areas vulnerable to tsunamis, etc.
  • Related organizations should cooperatively promote efforts to secure evacuation areas and routes, seismic reinforcement work for shelters, elimination of power poles when developing evacuation routes, and seismic reinforcement work for buildings along roads, etc. as countermeasures against tsunamis.
  • Automation and remote control of floodgates and sluiceways, etc. should be steadily promoted in areas with a high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake, while trying to control such facilities effectively with the top priority placed on ensuring the safety of the operators thereof.
  • When developing river dikes and coastal dikes, due consideration should be given to symbiosis with nature and harmony with the environment.
  • Seaside disaster-prevention forests should be grown by developing areas that serve as bases for growth or by planting saplings, in light of the circumstances of respective regions and also in consideration of their effects to mitigate tsunami damage.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Preparation of tsunami disaster information maps: 20% (2013) → 100% (2015)

[METI and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF)] Municipalities that have prepared and publicized hazard maps for largest scale tsunamis and have conducted emergency drills: 14% (2012) → 100% (2016)

[MLIT] Improvement of the accuracy of the emergency earthquake warning (margin of error in estimated seismic intensity being less than 1 level in either direction): 79% (2012) → 85% (2015)

[MLIT and MAFF] Completion ratio of the development of coastal dikes, etc. (construction of coastal dikes, etc. up to the planned height and seismic reinforcement work) in areas with a high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake, such as a Tokai, Tonankai or Nankai earthquake: Approx. 31% (2012) → Approx. 66% (2016)

[MAFF] Population ratio in fishing villages where measures to strengthen disaster prevention functions have been taken: 49% (2011) → Almost 80% (2016)

[MLIT and MAFF] Completion ratio of the work for automation and remote control of floodgates and sluiceways, etc. in areas with a high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake, such as a Tokai, Tonankai or Nankai earthquake: Approx. 33% (2012) → Approx. 57% (2016)

*1-4) Prolonged and wide-area flooding in urban areas due to abnormal weather, etc.

  • Excavation of river channels, construction of dikes, development and strengthening of functions of flood control facilities, and development of drainage facilities, such as drainage pump stations and rain-water reservation pipes, etc., should be promoted. At the same time, disaster mitigation measures should be taken integrally with measures for promoting effective land use. Assistance shall be provided for the preparation of flood hazard maps and inland flood hazard maps in order to ensure smooth and prompt evacuation in the event of a flood, and other non-structural measures, including furthering the sophistication of disaster prevention information and the strengthening of regional flood-fighting capabilities, should be properly combined and implemented.
  • While giving due consideration to symbiosis with nature and harmony with the environment, as well as to cost reduction, the development of facilities should be carried out intensively by prioritizing those for which high investment effects are expected. Aiming to minimize damage due to disasters in response to changes in nature and society, such as a climate change or population aging with low birth rate, various development means should be introduced and effective use of existing facilities should be sought, while strengthening the risk management system.
  • Non-structural efforts should be further promoted, such as the preparation of inland flood hazard maps, flood hazard maps, and others.
  • Many of the disaster prevention departments and sewerage-related departments of local governments face personnel shortages or have insufficient organizational systems. Therefore, they are to be encouraged to build proper organizational systems and devise systems for human resources development.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Completion ratio of the development of rivers against mid-term goals in areas where people and assets are concentrated: Approx. 74% (2012) → Approx. 76% (2016)

[MLIT] Municipalities that have prepared and publicized inland flood hazard maps and have conducted emergency drills: 31% (2012) → 100% (2016)

[MLIT] Municipalities that have prepared and publicized flood hazard maps and have conducted emergency drills: 62% (2012) → 100% (2016)

[MLIT] Completion ratio of measures against floods in cities through the improvement of sewerage systems: Approx. 55% (2012) → Approx. 60% (2016)

*1-5) A large number of casualties due to a large-scale volcanic eruption or sediment disaster (deep-seated landslide), etc., which may also increase vulnerability of national land over years to come

  • Non-structural measures should be improved, such as the enhancement of disaster prevention information relating to volcanic eruptions, typhoons, torrential rainfalls, etc., integration of hazard maps, implementation of disaster prevention assessment, and utilization of three-dimensional geospatial information.
  • Forests are to be developed based on local vegetation, while taking thorough measures against bird and animal damage, with the goal of creating diversified forests in symbiosis with nature. At the same time, disaster prevention and mitigation functions inherent to the ecosystem should be assessed qualitatively to reduce disaster damage effectively and efficiently through the conservation and renewal of the natural environment.
  • Based on the results of the survey and monitoring of locations with higher risks of being hit by disasters, efforts for enhancing disaster prevention capabilities should be made in proper combination of non-structural measures such as the development of emergency drill and evacuation systems and by comprehensively taking measures for creating disaster resilient forests and dealing with sediment disasters by effective and efficient methods.
  • Based on full checks of reservoirs and other agricultural water facilities, structural measures for enhancing the earthquake resistance of those facilities and other non-structural measures should be taken and facility management systems should be enhanced, in addition to making efforts for improving disaster prevention and mitigation capabilities of local communities.
  • A volcanic eruption alert system should be developed and a risk management plan should be established in preparation for a sediment disaster that may be caused by a volcanic eruption.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Cabinet Office] Concrete and practical evacuation plans established (against volcanic eruptions): 13% (2012) → 100% ( – )

[MLIT] Number of houses to be preserved from sediment disasters: Approx. 1.08 million houses (2012) → Approx. 1.14 million houses (2018)

[MLIT] Sediment disaster countermeasures implemented for preserving socially and economically important facilities (places relating to major traffic networks): Approx. 47% (2012) → Approx. 51% (2016)

[MAFF] Dams and other very important agricultural water facilities with a seismic design corresponding to a level 2 earthquake motion for which inspections have been conducted: 40% (2012) → 60% (2016)

[MAFF] Reservoirs whose collapse would cause significant damage and for which a hazard map has been prepared or other non-structural measures have been implemented: 30% (2012) → 100% (2020)

[MAFF] Number of local communities where surrounding forests would properly fulfill their function to prevent mountain disasters: 55,000 communities (2013) → 58,000 communities (2018)

*1-6) A large number of casualties due to delay in evacuation caused by failure of information transmission, etc.

  • The national government will steadily promote diversification of secure and prompt means to provide information to local governments and the general public through encouraging municipalities’ installation of J-ALERT, an automatic alert system, and digitization of emergency municipal radio communication systems, the private sector’s participation in the Information Commons, and radio station disaster countermeasures including those for poor radio reception. Additionally, easy-to-understand evacuation signs for evacuees should be devised and the police and fire departments, etc. should endeavor to make their communication infrastructure and facilities more robust and sophisticated.
  • Relevant ministries and agencies will further facilitate the diversification and securing of means to collect information through the use of IT with the aim of enabling the early detection of damage based on vehicle probe information, etc. in collaboration with private business operators, the provision of earthquake-related information using GPS wave gauges, monitoring networks for earthquakes and tsunamis in coastal areas, and the GNSS system, and the development of an electronic disaster prevention information system, etc.
  • In order to further facilitate effective utilization of obtained information through the development of means to collect and provide information, personnel and organizational systems should be developed for local governments: the major entities to collect and provide information.
  • Installation of power source devices to traffic signals should be promoted with the aim of preventing delay in evacuation due to traffic congestion that is likely to occur upon a disaster.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC)] Installation of the national early warning system (J-ALERT): 93% (2013) → 100% (2014)

[MIC] Introduction of the Information Commons by prefectures: 32% (2013) → 100% (2016)

[MIC] Relay stations of AM radio stations (key stations) developed as measures to resolve poor radio reception: 0% (2013) → 100% (2018)

[MLIT] Hours required for providing information, such as the scale of an earthquake: 300 minutes (2012) → 3 minutes (2014)

[MLIT] Dissemination among municipalities of guidelines for communication of disaster information to foreign tourists: None (2013) → 1,700 municipalities (2018)

[NPA] Number of traffic signals equipped with power source devices to prevent their failures upon a blackout: 5,229 units (2012) → 6,400 units (2016)

2. Ensure prompt rescue and first-aid activities and provision of medical care from immediately after a large-scale natural disaster (including responses required in the absence of such activities).

*2-1) Prolonged suspension of supply of food, drinking water and other vital goods

  • In order to secure land, maritime and air routes for transporting goods for sure, countermeasures against earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and snow disasters, etc. for transportation infrastructure should be steadily promoted, including seismic reinforcement work for maritime transport terminals in preparation for a possible disruption of land transportation. At the same time, efforts should be made to secure multiple transportation routes through collaboration among different transportation modes.
  • It should be ensured that accurate road traffic information can be ascertained after the occurrence of a disaster through the use of private-sector probe information, etc., and required systems for improving materials and equipment and for collecting, sharing and providing information need to be developed in collaboration among relevant organizations, with the aim of ensuring prompt opening of transportation routes.
  • While steadily promoting seismic reinforcement work for water facilities, relevant ministries should discuss the use of diverse water resources, including ground water, rain water and recycled water.
  • In collaboration with schools, hospitals and other relevant organizations, as well as local governments, replacement of gas tubes with corrosion resistant and quake resistant ones should be promoted steadily.
  • Efforts should be made to strengthen disaster response capacity of private logistics facilities: which serve as regional bases to store and supply food and fuel, etc. Disaster prevention functions of school facilities: which are used as shelters, should also be enhanced. Individual households and shelters are to be encouraged to secure stocks respectively.
  • Regarding stocks of emergency food, concrete measures should be discussed by envisaging specific types of large-scale natural disasters.
  • Guidelines for temporal storage and treatment of fuel, etc. should be fully disseminated to relevant organizations together with sufficient information thereon.
  • The national and local governments and private business operators should build systems for procurement and supply of goods through the use of private logistics facilities, holding of conference meetings of related parties, conclusion of agreements and establishment of BCPs. Public and private parties should jointly conduct drills for transporting relief goods to enhance the effectiveness of the systems so as to ensure prompt and efficient responses in an emergency. Furthermore, in order to enable smooth and proper provision of push-type (active) support and pull-type (passive) support, response procedures should be discussed in tandem with the building of an information collection and provision system.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Coverage of people to whom emergency relief goods can be supplied via ports in areas with an especially high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake: 59% (2012) → 64% (2016)

[MHLW] Proportion of core water pipes which meet quake-resistance standards: 34% (2012) → 50% (2022)

[Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)] Pipes with high earthquake resistance, such as polyethylene pipes, among the total length of the low-pressure main and branch pipes (nationwide): 81% (2012) → 90% (2025)

[MAFF] Fulfillment of stock of emergency food: Maintain 100% every year

[METI] Installation of petroleum product storage tanks at facilities to be used as shelters: 31% (2013) → 100% (2018)

[MLIT] Places where broad-based relief goods transportation drills have been conducted: 33% (2013) → 100% (2017)

[MLIT] Regions where conferences, etc. consisting of diverse logistics business operators have been established: 0% (2013) → 100% (2017)

2-2) Concurrent occurrence of isolation of many villages for long periods

  • Steady efforts should be made for disaster prevention measures and countermeasures against earthquakes for roads, elimination of power poles along emergency transportation roads, countermeasures against earthquakes and strengthening of resilience to tsunamis for rail and port facilities, countermeasures against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis, tidal waves, and wind and flood damage, and soil conservation measures.
  • Measures for ensuring flexible and efficient activities in the event of a disaster should be promoted. Such measures include the development of systems necessary for opening sea routes and land routes, preparation of equipment necessary for transportation, enhancement of robustness and sophistication of the communication infrastructure and facilities, building of a system for collection and provision of disaster-related information, and utilization of geospatial information.
  • With the aim of effectively utilizing existing logistics functions for transporting relief goods in an emergency, efforts for securing evacuation routes and alternate transportation routes should be promoted through developing a system for emergency transportation by ship, encouraging cargo distributors to establish BCPs, and ascertaining and utilizing roads in mountainous regions managed by diverse entities including the private sector.
  • Envisaging cases of extensive damage over wide areas, procurement and storage of raw materials and sufficient emergency food and other necessities should be ensured nationwide in collaboration with the private sector, and the establishment of joint BCPs across multiple companies should be encouraged.
  • Structures of local administrative organs (including the police and fire services) should be strengthened for the purpose of avoiding a significant functional decline due to damage to their personnel and facilities.
  • In order to properly collect and provide disaster-related information, diverse means therefor should be secured through the use of private-sector probe information, etc.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Proportion of bridges with seismic resistance: 79% (2012) → 82% (2016)

[MLIT] Places where required countermeasures, such as those for slopes along roads, have been taken: 60% (2012) → 68% (2016)

[Ministry of Defense (DA)] Preparation of equipment for enhancing disaster response capacity: 0% (2013) → 100% (2018)

*2-3) Absolute lack of rescue and emergency activities due to damage to the self-defense forces, the police, fire services, the Japan Coast Guard, etc.

  • The self-defense forces, police, fire services, the Japan Coast Guard, etc. should endeavor to improve their systems and equipment for enhancing their disaster response capacity. Further efforts should be made to strengthen the Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC-FORCE), flood control companies and voluntary disaster prevention organizations, provide training for the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), and secure personnel in the construction industry who will engage in work for elimination of road obstacles in an emergency. Means for accepting overseas emergency aid teams and making adjustments in collaborative activities should also be clarified in advance, based on the experience of accepting the US army’s “Operation Tomodachi” after the Great East Japan Earthquake.
  • Standardization of disaster response duties and information sharing of relevant ministries and agencies should be discussed and standardization should be promoted for necessary matters. Relevant ministries and agencies should endeavor to enhance the effectiveness of their disaster response duties by conducting joint drills with clear goals in mind, while developing an appropriate training environment simulating various disasters in light of regional characteristics.
  • Facilities that serve as bases of emergency activities in respective regions, such as those of the police, self-defense forces, and fire stations, should be made more resilient against earthquakes and other disasters. Additionally, their information and communication functions should also steadily be updated and made more disaster resilient, by such means as digitizing emergency wireless communication systems for fire services and upgrading radio relay links of the police.
  • Local governments and relevant ministries and agencies should jointly endeavor to enhance the disaster resistance of various activity bases and routes and support smooth activities by promoting the use of private-sector probe information, installation of power source devices to traffic signals, utilization of roundabouts, and discussions on standardization of map information, etc.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MIC] Enforcement of Emergency Fire Response Teams: 4,600 teams (2013) → 6,000 teams (2018)

[MLIT] Conclusion of liaison agreements: 93% (2013) → 100% (2016)

[DA] Preparation of equipment for enhancing disaster response capacity: 0% (2013) → 100% (2018) (mentioned above)

[NPA] Construction of facilities for disaster security drills: 0% (2013) → 100% (2016)

[NPA] Proportion of prefectural police headquarters and other police stations with seismic resistance: 82% (2012) → 90% (2015)

[MIC] Bodies which have completed digitization of fire emergency communication systems: 31% (2013) → 100% (2016)

[NPA] Number of traffic signals equipped with power source devices to prevent their failures upon a blackout: 5,229 units (2012) → 6,400 units (2016) (mentioned above)

2-4) Prolonged suspension of energy supply for rescue/emergency activities and medical services

  • Required amount of stockpiles should be ascertained based on the envisaged demand for petroleum products in the event of a disaster and a collaboration system among relevant ministries and agencies should be built.
  • The supply side should also make preparations for disasters, such as the installation of fuel tanks and private generation facilities. Measures for assisting medical facilities and welfare facilities should be discussed to avoid prolonged suspension of energy supply to such facilities in an emergency, in accordance with the progress of the introduction of independent and distributed energy (gas cogeneration systems).
  • Given that energy supply becomes impossible if infrastructure therefor sustains damage, countermeasures against earthquakes, tsunamis, wind and flood damage and other disasters should be promoted steadily for roads.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[METI] Installation of petroleum product storage tanks at facilities to be used as shelters: 31% (2013) → 100% (2018) (mentioned above)

2-5) Shortage of food and drinking water, etc. caused by the number of people stranded due to a disaster and the length of time beyond expectations

  • Measures for people to be stranded due to a disaster started to be taken based on Urban Renaissance and Safety Assurance Plans and Area Disaster Prevention Plans. From now on, efforts for ensuring assistance to people walking back home should also be promoted, in addition to those for securing temporary housing that will become necessary for accommodating a large number of people deprived of means to go back home upon a disaster. Due to the fact that school facilities that will be used as temporary housing and shelters do not always have sufficient earthquake resistance or disaster prevention functions (storehouses, batteries, alternate water sources, etc.), their capacity to accommodate stranded people and evacuees should be enhanced.
  • Collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies should be adjusted in advance with regard to countermeasures against earthquakes and other disasters for roads, elimination of power poles along emergency transportation roads, and countermeasures against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis, and tidal waves, etc.
  • Traffic congestion should be accurately ascertained by using private-sector vehicle probe information and measures should be taken to prevent traffic congestion caused by failures of signals due to a blackout.
  • Measures should be taken to avoid a significant decline of functions of local administrative organs (including the police, etc.) due to injuries and damage to their personnel and facilities.
  • Large cities are to be encouraged to take measures for securing alternate transportation means in preparation for a possible disruption of rail services.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT and Cabinet Secretariat] Number of areas where Urban Renaissance and Safety Assurance Plans and Area Disaster Prevention Plans have been established: 11 areas (2013) → 45 areas (2018)

2-6) Paralysis of medical services due to damage to and/or severe lack of medical facilities and personnel, and disruption of routes for offering support

  • Seismic reinforcement work should be steadily conducted for core disaster hospitals and medical emergency centers that fulfil functions as the core medical institutions during large-scale earthquakes.
  • Disaster prevention and mitigation functions (securing of enough water and countermeasures against floods, etc.) should be enhanced at national university-affiliated hospitals that serve as core disaster hospitals in an emergency.
  • A broad-based welfare support network among private bodies and business operators should be built as a mechanism to dispatch welfare personnel to disaster affected areas broadly from other areas so that welfare assistance can be provided properly to victims in the event of a large-scale disaster.
  • In order to enable the DMAT to reach core disaster hospitals smoothly, steady efforts should be made to eliminate power poles along emergency transportation roads, strengthen port facilities’ resilience to earthquakes and tidal waves, and take countermeasures against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis, and tidal waves, etc. Means for distributing relief goods should also be secured. Additionally, discussions should be held on how to provide medical services promptly in the event of a disaster in disaster affected areas.
  • Delays in emergency transportation of patients should be eliminated through the use of private-sector vehicle probe information and by preventing traffic congestion to be caused by failures of signals due to a blackout.
  • In order to handle a tremendous number of people injured in the event of a disaster, a collaboration system involving local medical institutions should be built.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MHLW] Core disaster hospitals that have the DMAT: Maintain 100% every fiscal year

[MHLW] Number of prefectures that have started to build a broad-based welfare support network: 16 prefectures (2013) → 47 prefectures (2016)

2-7) Outbreak of plagues or infectious diseases on a large scale in disaster-affected areas

  • Vaccination should be promoted from normal times to prevent the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. Additionally, sterilization and pest control should be conducted and a system should be built for promptly eliminating and disposing of sewage from the living space of disaster victims.
  • In collaboration with local governments, seismic reinforcement work for sewage facilities and establishment of sewerage BCPs should be promoted.
  • Initiatives for supporting medical activities should steadily implemented.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MHLW] Number of municipalities that have conducted sterilization based on the Act on Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients Suffering Infectious Diseases: 140 municipalities

[MHLW] People who have received measles and rubella vaccination based on the Preventive Vaccinations Act: Over 95%

[MLIT] Sewage systems for which BCPs against tsunamis have been established: Approx. 9% (2012) → Approx. 100% (2016)

3. Secure indispensable administrative functions from immediately after a large-scale natural disaster.

3-1) A decline in public safety due to escape of inmates from correctional facilities and a significant deterioration of the functions of local police due to damage

  • A system should be built for sharing information on damage to correctional facilities among relevant organizations.
  • Seismic reinforcement work for correctional facilities should be promoted steadily.
  • Efforts should be made to improve systems and equipment necessary for securing public safety.
  • In order to maintain public safety and order, the national government will promptly determine policies and an execution system for smoothly continuing relevant duties.
  • In order to prevent traffic congestion and accidents to be caused by failures of signals due to a blackout, installation of power source devices to traffic signals should be promoted. Additionally, utilization of roundabouts, which will ensure safe traffic even in the event of a disaster, should be encouraged.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Ministry of Justice (MOJ)] Offices that have considered and built a system for sharing information on damage to correctional facilities among relevant organizations: None (2013) → 177 offices (2014)

[MOJ] Proportion of correctional facilities with seismic resistance: 70% (2012) → 100% ( – )

[NPA] Number of traffic signals equipped with power source devices to prevent their failures upon a blackout: 5,229 units (2012) → 6,400 units (2016) (mentioned above)

3-2) Frequent serious traffic accidents due to traffic light failures, etc.

  • Efforts should be promoted for ascertaining traffic information promptly by the use of private-sector vehicle probe information.
  • Installation of power source devices to traffic signals should be promoted steadily from a medium-to long-term perspective with the aim of preventing traffic congestion and accidents caused by failures of signals due to a blackout. Additionally, utilization of roundabouts, which will ensure safe traffic even in the event of a disaster, should be encouraged.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[NPA] Number of traffic signals equipped with power source devices to prevent their failures upon a blackout: 5,229 units (2012) → 6,400 units (2016) (mentioned above)

*3-3) Dysfunction of the central government in the capital region

  • Based on the government-wide business continuity plan, BCPs of respective ministries and agencies should be evaluated and reviewed on an ongoing basis to enhance their effectiveness.
  • Seismic reinforcement work for government facilities should be steadily conducted depending on their disaster prevention functions and usage, at least to the extent to ensure human lives and facility functions against envisaged earthquakes and tsunamis.
  • Each ministry and agency must promote independent efforts to enhance its offices’ earthquake resistance, ensure power and information and communication systems, store necessities, and secure alternate offices so that the central government can continue its urgent emergency duties even under the prolonged influence of a large-scale natural disaster, such as a capital inland earthquake. In particular, with regard to the Cabinet Office’s Anti-Disaster Radio Communication System, efforts for ensuring emergency power and the looping and backup thereof should be strengthened in the capital region.
  • In order to prevent dysfunction due to damage to infrastructure and suspension of energy supply in the vicinity of government facilities, steady efforts should be made for disaster prevention measures for roads, elimination of power poles along emergency transportation roads, strengthening of port facilities’ resilience to earthquakes and tsunamis, and countermeasures against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis and tidal waves, as well as for the increase of stockpiles of petroleum products.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Relevant ministries and agencies] Revision of BCPs of ministries and agencies based on the government-wide business continuity plan: None (2013) → All ministries and agencies (2014)

[Cabinet Office] Evaluation of BCPs of respective ministries and agencies: None (2013) → All ministries and agencies (2015)

[Relevant ministries and agencies] Stock of fuel for power generation necessary for continuing business (each ministry and agency is supposed to stock fuel for around one week): Stock for around three days (2012) → Stock for around one week ( – )

3-4) Significant deterioration of the functions of local governments due to damage to personnel and facilities

  • As maintaining the functions of local administrative organs is extremely significant for ensuring resilience, local governments should establish and review their BCPs and strengthen their systems to continue business through efforts for enhancing the effectiveness of their BCPs and through conclusion of agreements with other organizations.
  • Relevant ministries and agencies and local governments are to be encouraged to build collaboration schemes among them in preparation for disaster risks. Such schemes include systems for emergency rescue activities, and for proper stockpiling and provision of petroleum products necessary for maintaining medical activities, etc.
  • Seismic reinforcement work should be conducted for local governments’ facilities, including police stations and fire stations, as well as for schools, public education facilities and public athletic facilities that can back up local governments’ functions when their offices are severely damaged. The earthquake resistance of communication facilities should also be enhanced for ensuring necessary communication functions. Required materials and equipment for these facilities must be prepared and installed.
  • At evacuation sites and disaster prevention centers (public facilities) that accommodate evacuees in an emergency like a blackout, electricity indispensable for the daily lives of evacuees need to be secured.
  • Peripheral measures for maintaining functions of administrative organs should also be steadily implemented. These include disaster prevention measures and countermeasures against earthquakes for roads, elimination of power poles along emergency transportation roads, strengthening of port facilities’ resilience to earthquakes and tsunamis, countermeasures against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis, tidal waves, and wind and flood damage, and soil conservation measures.
  • Efforts for enhancing the earthquake resistance of non-structural members, such as suspended ceilings, for school facilities should be further accelerated and a system should be built to facilitate measures to prevent ceilings from falling, etc. by fostering specialized engineers and otherwise offering technical assistance.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MIC] Proportion of public facilities with seismic resistance that are to be used as disaster prevention centers: 83% (2012) → 100% ( – )

[Ministry of the Environment (MOE)] Establishment of business plans for introducing renewable energy to disaster prevention centers, etc. in 47 prefectures and 20 government-designated cities: 57% (2013) → 100% ( – )

4. Secure indispensable information communication functions from immediately after a large-scale natural disaster.

*4-1) Paralysis and prolonged suspension of information transmission due to suspension of power supply, etc.

  • While trying to visualize interdependent relationships pertaining to information communication, vulnerabilities of the information communication system against prolonged suspension of power supply should be assessed and measures should be taken as necessary.
  • Technological standards against damage or failure of telecommunication equipment should be reviewed depending on the level of damage due to a disaster (communication interruption, power outage, etc.) and business operators are to be encouraged to check their conformity with the standards by themselves.
  • In order to prevent prolonged power outages, steady efforts should be made for the development of an evaluation and certification infrastructure for ensuring security of the control system for power and gas, etc., and the elimination of power poles along roads. Regional disaster prevention measures such as those against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis, and tidal waves should also be taken step by step.
  • In order to ensure rescue activities even in the case where private carriers’ lines are interrupted, the police, self-defense forces, and the Japan Coast Guard should endeavor to enhance the disaster resilience of their information communication systems.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MIC] Conformity with the Regulations for Telecommunications Facilities for Telecommunications Business (Ordinance of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications): Maintain 100%

[NPA] Achievement of upgrading of radio relay links: 54% (2013) → 100% (2018)

[MLIT] Progress of installing digital wireless equipment: 94% (2013) → 100% (2015)

4-2) Circumstances where various important mail is left undelivered due to prolonged suspension of postal services

  • Japan Post, Co., Ltd. will continue its efforts to enhance the earthquake resistance of its post offices and other facilities and will review its BCP as necessary.

4-3) Circumstances where disaster information cannot be delivered to people who need it due to suspension of TV and radio broadcasting

  • In order to ensure the continuation of radio broadcasting, which plays a significant role as people’s means to obtain information in the event of a disaster, appropriate measures should be taken, such as the relocation of radio stations to safer places and the development of supplementary FM stations and backup stations, while taking regional disaster prevention measures and enhancing the earthquake resistance of buildings.
  • Alternate means for information provision should be developed in preparation for cases where TV and radio broadcasting is suspended. Relevant entities are to be encouraged to join the Information Commons, which will be the basis for the development of alternate means.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MIC] Relay stations developed as disaster prevention measures for radio stations (key stations) located in areas with a possibility of being damaged by a natural disaster: 23% (2013) → 100% (2018)

[MIC] Introduction of the Information Commons by prefectures: 32% (2013) → 100% (2016) (mentioned above)

5. Prevent functional disturbance in economic activities (including supply chains) even after the occurrence of a large-scale natural disaster.

*5-1) Loss of international competitiveness due to a decline in companies’ productivity caused by disruption of supply chains, etc.

  • It is necessary for companies to establish not only individual BCPs but also joint BCPs across multiple companies in order to secure supply chains in the event of a large-scale natural disaster. Therefore, relevant ministries and agencies and the public sector should broadly cooperate with each other and promote such initiatives in an efficient manner. Individual companies are also encouraged to establish their own BCPs and enhance their effectiveness.
  • Measures for enhancing disaster resilience of logistics facilities and routes should be promoted. These include centralization of sea traffic control, establishment of plans for opening sea roads, selection of broad-based distribution bases, countermeasures against earthquakes and other disasters for roads, elimination of power poles along emergency transportation roads, strengthening of port facilities’ resilience to earthquakes and tidal waves, and countermeasures against floods, sediment disasters, tsunamis, and tidal waves. In that process, in order to maximize the effects, each regional block must keep connections and make adjustments. In tandem with the progress of such efforts, BCPs for building regional resilience (provisional title) should be established for each regional block through the collaboration of relevant ministries and agencies, their regional branch bureaux, local governments and economic organizations, etc.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Cabinet Office] Large enterprises and medium-sized enterprises that have prepared BCPs:

Large enterprises: 45.8% (2011) → Almost 100% (2020);

Medium-sized enterprises: 20.8% (2011) → 50% (2020)

[MLIT] Specified logistics facilities that have selected broad-based distribution bases: 28% (2013) → 100% (2016)

[MLIT] Emergency sea roads for which plans for opening sea roads have been established: 0% (2012) → 100% (2016)

*5-2) Suspension of energy supply necessary for social economic activities and the maintenance of supply chains

  • In order to strengthen a backup system for fuel supply, plans for cooperation regarding oil supply or liquefied petroleum gas supply upon a disaster and BCPs established by oil refinery companies and oil wholesalers should be improved through conducting drills, and relevant entities are to be encouraged to reinforce their systems and review their plans and BCPs.
  • In order to secure fuel supply routes, measures should be taken for transportation infrastructure to enhance its resilience to earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, sediment disasters, and snow disasters. Additionally, relevant organizations should cooperate with each other to develop necessary systems for ensuring prompt opening of transportation routes after a disaster, such as through the improvement of equipment and the sharing of information, while seeking means for better cooperation and procedural improvements for smooth transportation of fuel.
  • Efforts should be made to improve and maintain the supply capacity of service stations and LP gas stations, which serve as energy supply terminals, as well as that of gas pipes, and individual factories and business offices should endeavor to introduce private generators and store sufficient fuel.
  • Relevant organizations should carry out joint drills against disasters at industrial complexes, focusing on how to ensure energy supply chains.
  • After the occurrence of a disaster, fuel supply is expected to be limited, but energy demand will increase for emergency power generation and transportation of critical materials. Therefore, how to place priorities on destinations to supply energy should be determined in advance.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[METI] BCPs prepared by incorporating backup systems by oil refinery companies and oil wholesalers: 0% (2012) → 100% (2014)

[METI] Implementation of human resources development projects, such as emergency drills, by prefectures: 100% every fiscal year

[METI] Implementation of drills under a plan for cooperation in oil supply during a disaster: 100% every fiscal year

[DA] Achievement of drill targets: 100% every fiscal year

5-3) Damage to and fires or explosions, etc. at complexes and other important industrial facilities

  • The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications will publicize assessment guidelines for disaster prevention for industrial complexes and provide information on past accidents, thereby encouraging prefectures to review their disaster prevention plans for petrochemical complexes. With regard to activities of private fire brigades at specified business establishments, collaboration among relevant organizations should be furthered and their disaster prevention systems should be enhanced.
  • Countermeasures against earthquakes and tsunamis should be steadily promoted for equipment at industrial complexes. These include seismic reinforcement work and enhanced embankment work. Related research and technological development should also be promoted.
  • Repair of oil tanks should be carried out for enhancing their earthquake resistance. With regard to high-pressure gas facilities for which quake-resistance standards were revised after the Great East Japan Earthquake and other existing high-pressure gas facilities of great importance, seismic reinforcement work should be steadily carried out and further revision of quake-resistance standards should be discussed in preparation for a possible Nankai Trough earthquake or a capital inland earthquake.
  • As there is a risk that a fire, smoke or leakage of hazardous materials may cause significant damage to people’s lives and economic activities in the vicinity of industrial complexes, relevant organizations should have proper countermeasures in place.
  • In preparation for disasters at complexes, a system for the Dragon Hyper Command Unit (emergency response unit against disasters in the energy and industrial infrastructure) should be strengthened, while promoting joint drills among relevant organizations and research and development of advanced fire-fighting robots.
  • Private business operators should establish joint BCP and BCM structures across multiple companies within the respective industrial complexes and make sustainable efforts.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MIC] Disaster prevention headquarters that have reviewed their disaster prevention plans for petrochemical complexes: 0% (2013) → 100% (2018)

[MIC] Proportion of oil tanks which meet quake-resistance standards: 98% (2012) → 100% (2016)

[MIC] Registration of the Dragon Hyper Command Unit provided for in a plan on basic matters concerning the organization of an Emergency Fire Rescue Unit and the development of facilities, etc.: 0 unit (2013) → 12 units (2018)

5-4) Significant influence on overseas trade due to suspension of maritime transport functions

  • In order to ensure maritime transport even in an emergency, joint efforts should be made by relevant organizations in cooperation and collaboration among relevant ministries and agencies, aiming to build a mechanism to secure maritime and air transport networks in advance and strengthen systems for ensuring prompt and smooth opening of sea roads and monitoring of circumstances.
  • Coast protection measures should be promoted, while carrying out seismic reinforcement work for port facilities and aids to navigation in preparation for a possible disruption of land transportation.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Introduction of independent power sources to aids to navigation: 84% (2012) → 86% (2016)

*5-5) Dysfunction of the core road/marine transport networks, such as disruption of arteries in the Pacific Belt Zone

  • Accuracy should be enhanced for damage to transport facilities envisaged to be caused by earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, etc., as well as for envisaged social and economic influences of a disruption of major transport networks.
  • Risks of a disruption between eastern Japan and western Japan should be accurately assessed and measures should be put in place based thereon under time management principles.
  • Measures should be taken to strengthen the disaster response capacity of traffic facilities. These include disaster prevention measures and countermeasures against earthquakes for roads, elimination of power poles along emergency transportation roads, strengthening of port facilities’ resilience to earthquakes and tidal waves, seismic reinforcement work for traffic facilities such as rails and airports. Furthermore, peripheral measures for protecting traffic facilities (flood control, soil conservation, coast protection and sediment control measures, such as by ascertaining risks of floods and sediment disasters, sharing information and carrying out research and studies) should also be promoted.
  • The national and local governments should make sufficient preparations with awareness that it is highly possible that the core transport networks linking eastern Japan and western Japan could become dysfunctional due to a large-scale disaster and a considerable time would be required for recovering them.
  • BCPs for ports should be established and discussions should be held on how to respond to cases of a loss of capacity due to concurrent damage to multiple port facilities or a suspension of maritime transport functions due to damage to ships.
  • Measures to control demand in an emergency (a disruption of the core transport networks) should be discussed (ascertaining of the minimum required levels of passenger and freight flows, preparation of guidelines for companies’ facilities and deployment of personnel, etc.).
  • Relevant organizations should jointly carry out measures for ensuring smooth utilization of existing traffic networks in an emergency (consideration of alternate routes and dissemination and diffusion of related information, building of systems for securing maritime and air transport networks, etc.).
  • In order to build multi-axis transport networks (securing collaboration and substitutability among different transport modes upon a disaster), expressway networks, including the Shin Tomei Expressway, and Shinkansen networks should be steadily developed.
  • PR activities should be carried out to have people broadly understand the importance of the national and local governments and private business operators jointly making preparations for a possible situation where the core transport networks become dysfunctional, and private business operators are to be encouraged to build their BCP and BCM structures in consideration of such situation.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Development of road networks for ensuring redundancy: Approx. 47% (2011) → Approx. 50% (2016)

[MLIT] Ports for which BCPs were decided on for international strategic ports, international hub ports or major ports: 3% → 100% (2016)

[MLIT] Places where required countermeasures, such as those for slopes along roads, have been taken: 60% (2012) → 68% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Sediment disaster countermeasures implemented for preserving socially and economically important facilities (places relating to major traffic networks): Approx. 47% (2012) → Approx. 51% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Proportion of major rail lines with seismic resistance in areas where a seismic intensity of 6 upper is envisaged in the event of a capital inland earthquake or a Nankai Trough earthquake: 91% (2012) → Almost 100% (2017) (mentioned above)

5-6) Concurrent damage to multiple airports

  • A system for collaboration among airports should be built to make it possible to secure necessary transportation capacity through broad-based collaboration in the event of extensive damage.
  • Measures to effectively utilize existing roads and railroads should be taken from the perspective of securing collaboration and substitutability among different transport modes.
  • Seismic reinforcement work should be steadily carried out for airports and other related facilities as a means to strengthen disaster response capacity of traffic facilities.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Number of airports for which plans for early recovery from tsunami disasters have been established: 4 airports (2013) → 7 airports (2016)

[MLIT] Number of people residing within a certain distance from significant airports that will fulfil functions as centers for emergency and rescue activities and for transportation of critical materials upon the occurrence of a large-scale earthquake: 76 million people (2012) → 95 million people (2016)

5-7) Circumstances where dysfunction of financial services exerts tremendous influence on commercial transactions

  • The central bank and other financial institutions, as well as the Financial Services Agency should endeavor to establish their BCPs, secure redundancy of systems and communication means, and enhance the earthquake resistance of their premises. In particular, all major financial institutions should continue their efforts to secure backup sites for their system centers, etc. and enhance and maintain the effectiveness of their BCPs.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[Financial Services Agency (FSA)] Establishment of BCPs by financial institutions (regular members of the Japanese Bankers Association): Maintain their effectiveness

[FSA] Securing of backup sites for system centers, etc. by financial institutions (regular members of the Japanese Bankers Association): 98% (2013) → 100% (2015)

[FSA] Implementation of joint drills: 100% every fiscal year

[FSA] Installation of private generators to system centers and other important bases by financial institutions (regular members of the Japanese Bankers Association): Maintain their effectiveness

*5-8) Stagnation of stable supply of food, etc.

  • In order to maintain the smooth supply of food even in the event of a large-scale disaster, business operators that comprise the food supply chains should build systems for collaboration and cooperation for proper responses upon a disaster (expansion and dissemination of such systems among business operators in the food industry, those in relevant industries (transportation and warehouse businesses, etc.), and local governments, including a mechanism for joint distribution and sharing of an ordering system that can be utilized from normal times). BCPs for a series of production and logistics processes of fisheries products should also be prepared.
  • With the aim of enhancing disaster response capacity of production bases for the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industry, relevant entities should endeavor to carry out inspections of the earthquake resistance of production facilities, etc. and anti-seismic measures therefor, soil conservation measures and other disaster prevention measures for rural areas, while facility managers are to be encouraged to establish the BCP structures for their facilities.
  • The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries will promote measures combining non-structural measures such as promotion of conservation and management of facilities, enhancement of their disaster prevention and mitigation capabilities, and establishment of the BCP structure by facility managers, in collaboration with local communities.
  • While promoting countermeasures against earthquakes for roads, ports, and airports, etc. with the goal of enhancing the disaster response capacity of the logistics infrastructure, efforts should be made to build proper logistics networks incorporating the viewpoint of ensuring collaboration among different transportation modes and strengthening industrial competitiveness.
  • In developing the logistics infrastructure, strengthening of industrial competitiveness needs to be always kept in mind to achieve cost and lead time reduction.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MAFF] Establishment of systems for collaboration and cooperation by food business operators, etc.: 24% (2012) → 50% (2017)

[MAFF] Fishing ports serving as distribution bases where seismic reinforcement work has been conducted for landing quays: 32% (2012) → Almost 65% (2016)

[MAFF] Establishment of plans for preserving functions of the core agricultural water facilities developed by the national government: 60% (2012) → 80% (2016)

[MAFF] Checking and diagnosis conducted for agricultural bridges (those no shorter than 15m) and agricultural tunnels: 20% (2013) → 100% (2020)

[MAFF] Areas of farmland for which risks of flood damage are to be reduced: 21,000 ha (2012) → 100,000 ha (2016)

6. Secure minimum networks for electricity, gas, water and sewerage, fuel and transport required for people’s lives and economic activities even after the occurrence of a large-scale natural disaster, and seek early recovery of these networks.

*6-1) Suspension of functions of power supply networks (power generating/transforming stations, transmission/distribution equipment) and oil/LP gas supply chains

  • Measures for enhancing disaster response capacity of power generating/transforming stations, and power grids, as well as the entirety of the electricity system should be taken based on their stress tests against natural disasters and means for ensuring prompt restoration of functions after a disaster should be sought.
  • In order to secure emergency shipping capacity of refineries, installation of emergency equipment (power generators, information communication systems, and facilities for filling and shipping oil in drums) should be promoted at refineries.
  • Repair of oil tanks should be carried out for enhancing their earthquake resistance. Furthermore, steady efforts should be made to promote seismic reinforcement work for equipment based on stress tests of refineries, countermeasures against earthquakes and tsunamis such as enhanced embankment work, and related research and technological development. Related parties are to be encouraged to establish joint BCPs for ports in industrial complexes.
  • Seismic reinforcement work should be completed for national oil and liquefied petroleum gas stockpiling bases, and efforts for securing national stockpiles of petroleum products and liquefied petroleum gas should also be promoted.
  • In preparation for disasters at energy supply facilities, the system for the Dragon Hyper Command Unit (emergency response unit against disasters on the energy and industrial infrastructure) should be strengthened, while promoting joint drills among relevant organizations and research and development of advanced fire-fighting robots. Additionally, the capacity of voluntary disaster prevention organizations should be improved and strengthened.
  • In order to promote the diversification of energy supply sources, independent and distributed energy such as renewable energy should be actively introduced.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[METI] Introduction of three types of emergency equipment for refineries (power generators, information communication systems, facilities for filling and shipping oil in drums): 38% (2012) → 100% (2015)

[METI] Progress of anti-seismic measures for refineries: 0% (2012) → 100% (2020)

[MLIT] BCPs for ports with refineries established in collaboration among related parties with due consideration given to the status of the refineries: 0% (2012) → 100% (2016)

[METI] Achievement of goals for stockpiling of petroleum products: 95% (2013) → 100 % (2016)

[METI] Amount of national stockpiles of liquefied petroleum gas: 46% (2012) → 100% (2016)

[MIC] Registration of the Dragon Hyper Command Unit provided for in a plan on basic matters concerning the organization of an Emergency Fire Rescue Unit and the development of facilities, etc.: 0 unit (2013) → 12 units (2018) (mentioned above)

6-2) Prolonged suspension of water supply, etc.

  • Seismic reinforcement work should be steadily carried out for waterworks and industrial water facilities, while promoting collaboration among prefectures and water service operators, as well as human resources development and increase of know-how. A broad-based backup system should be developed to ensure prompt restoration after a large-scale disaster, and effective use of water resources including rainwater and recycled wastewater should be widely disseminated.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MHLW] Proportion of core water pipes which meet quake-resistance standards: 34% (2012) → 50% (2022) (mentioned above)

[METI] Establishment of renovation plans based on the Guidelines for Renovation, Anti-seismic Measures, and Asset Management of Industrial Water Facilities: 13% (2013) → 50% (2018)

6-3) Prolonged suspension of functions of sewage treatment facilities, etc.

  • In collaboration with local governments, seismic reinforcement work for sewage facilities and establishment of sewerage BCPs should be promoted.
  • Functions of rural community sewerage should be checked immediately and anti-seismic measures should be taken based thereon.
  • Old private wastewater septic tanks should be replaced with disaster-resilient combined septic tanks and the registry system needs to be developed.
  • In tandem with seismic reinforcement work for facilities, collaboration among management entities and strengthening of the management system should be sought along with efforts for securing substitutability.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MAFF] Rural areas where functions of rural community sewerage have been checked: 40% (2013) → 100% (2020)

[MLIT] Sewage systems for which BCPs against tsunamis have been established: Approx. 9% (2012) → Approx. 100% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Implementation of anti-seismic measures for sewer culvert significant from the viewpoint of overall countermeasures against earthquakes: Approx. 41% (2012) → Approx. 70% (2016)

[MOE] Number of municipalities that have developed their septic tank registry systems: 198 municipalities (2011) → 300 municipalities (2018)

6-4) Circumstances where local transport networks are disrupted

  • In order to secure land, maritime and air routes for transporting goods for sure, countermeasures against earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, sediment disasters and snow disasters, etc. should be steadily promoted, while attempting to secure multiple transportation routes through collaboration among different transportation modes. With regard to agricultural roads that can be utilized as alternate routes, managers of such roads should share information on the width and tolerable loads, etc. of respective roads.
  • It should be ensured that accurate road traffic information can be ascertained after the occurrence of a disaster through the use of private-sector probe information, etc., and required systems for improving materials and equipment and for collecting, sharing and providing information need to be developed in collaboration among relevant organizations, with the aim of ensuring prompt opening of transportation routes. Railway business operators should discuss procedures for resuming operations.
  • Administrative agencies should endeavor to ensure that vehicle users are provided with smooth responses if they have inquiries concerning various procedures after sustaining any damage due to a disaster.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MAFF] Checking and diagnosis conducted for agricultural bridges (those no shorter than 15m) and agricultural tunnels: 20% (2013) → 100% (2020) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Proportion of bridges with seismic resistance: 79% (2012) → 82% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Places where required countermeasures, such as those for slopes along roads, have been taken: 60% (2012) → 68% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Number of airports for which plans for early recovery from tsunami disasters have been established: 4 airports (2013) → 7 airports (2016) (mentioned above)

6-5) Disruption of supply of water for specific uses due to drought, etc.

  • Efforts should be made for developing water resource-related facilities and enhancing their functions, as well as effectively utilizing the existing facilities through collaboration among dams and other water resources including rainwater and recycled wastewater. Efficiency in the use and management of agricultural water should also be enhanced.
  • The national government will discuss drought management measures in response to climate changes and will establish guidelines for the utilization of groundwater and rainwater in the event of a disaster.
  • In order to properly deal with a possible drought exceeding currently envisaged levels, functions of water resource-related facilities should be enhanced and effective use of water resources should be furthered by fully utilizing existing facilities and sewage systems.

7. Prevent any uncontrollable second disaster.

7-1) Outbreak of large-scale fires in urban areas

  • In order to enable the police and fire services to carry out their rescue activities sufficiently under severe circumstances on site in the event of a disaster, such as a large-scale earthquake, efforts should be made to upgrade their systems and equipment, further improve environments for emergency drills, and make their communication infrastructure and facilities more robust and sophisticated. Structural and non-structural measures are to be properly combined to improve structures of local fire companies and voluntary disaster prevention organizations and to train the DMAT.
  • Initiatives for preventing fires and mitigating damage are to be facilitated. The public and private sectors should cooperate with each other in efforts for the improvement and development of densely-populated urban areas (5,745 ha) with extremely high risks of large-scale fires in the event of an earthquake. The improvement projects should be achieved in a planned manner by such means as developing evacuation sites and increasing anti-fire buildings. Even after achieving the initial goals, efforts should be continued to further improve such densely-populated urban areas from a medium- to long-term perspective.
  • Traffic congestion should be accurately ascertained by using private-sector probe information, which supplements traffic information collected by the police, and measures should be taken to prevent traffic congestion caused by failures of signals due to a blackout.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Area within densely-populated urban areas with extremely high risks in the event of an earthquake where the congestion has been resolved: 0 ha (2013) → 5,745 ha (2020) (mentioned above)

7-2) Occurrence of an extensive complex disaster on the sea or in coastal areas

  • In order to prevent the occurrence and expansion of industrial complex disasters, relevant organizations should carry out joint drills, while endeavoring to enhance their systems for sharing information on damage and taking responses to any large-scale special disasters, and improve the functions of their equipment and materials.
  • Further efforts should be made for countermeasures against earthquakes and tsunamis, such as seismic reinforcement work for facilities where dangerous materials are handled, construction and strengthening of breakwaters and embankments, and development of seaside disaster-prevention forests. Related research and technological development should also be promoted.
  • There is a risk of a secondary disaster due to the outflow of containers, vehicles, ships, oil tanks, etc. that may be caused by a large-scale tsunami. Therefore, measures should be put in place to prevent objects from floating out in an emergency.
  • Disaster prevention and mitigation functions inherent to the ecosystem should be assessed qualitatively to reduce disaster damage effectively and efficiently through the conservation and renewal of the natural environment.
  • As there is a risk that a fire, smoke or leakage of hazardous materials may cause significant damage to people’s lives and economic activities in the vicinity of industrial complexes, relevant organizations should have proper countermeasures in place and build systems to promptly and surely transmit information on a disaster in coastal areas to local residents.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MIC] Disaster prevention headquarters that have reviewed their disaster prevention plans for petrochemical complexes: 0% (2013) → 100% (2018) (mentioned above)

[METI] Progress of anti-seismic measures for refineries: 0% (2012) → 100% (2020) (mentioned above)

[MLIT and MAFF] Completion ratio of the development of coastal dikes, etc. (construction of coastal dikes, etc. up to the planned height and seismic reinforcement work) in areas with a high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake, such as a Tokai, Tonankai or Nankai earthquake: Approx. 31% (2012) → Approx. 66% (2016) (mentioned above)

7-3) Direct damage and traffic paralysis due to collapse of buildings along railroads and roads

  • From the viewpoint of avoiding damage and traffic paralysis due to collapse of buildings along railroads and roads, relevant ministries and agencies and local governments should jointly strengthen their initiatives. Additionally, they should further endeavor to prevent deterioration of administrative functions due to damage or injury to personnel, materials, and communication infrastructure so as to ensure sufficient rescue and emergency activities during a disaster.
  • Measures for enhancing the earthquake resistance of houses and buildings should be carried out carefully to achieve goals.
  • A disaster information collection system should be further enhanced to ensure early understanding of the entirety of the damage and prompt preparation of recovery plans by such means as highly accurate observation using earth observatory satellites.
  • It should be ensured that accurate road traffic information can be ascertained through the use of private-sector vehicle probe information, etc. and measures should be taken to prevent traffic congestion caused by failures of signals due to a blackout.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[NPA] Number of traffic signals equipped with power source devices to prevent their failures upon a blackout: 5,229 units (2012) → 6,400 units (2016) (mentioned above)

7-4) Occurrence of a secondary disaster due to damage to and functional failure of reservoirs, dams, disaster prevention facilities, natural dams, etc.

  • With regard to old reservoirs that are highly likely to be broken upon a large-scale earthquake, typhoon, or torrential rainfall, etc. and may cause damage to houses in the downstream areas, comprehensive checks should be completed at an early stage and required measures should be taken based on the results thereof.
  • It has taken considerable time to develop countermeasures against envisaged disasters and there is a risk that it will be difficult to respond to disasters beyond such levels, posing a risk of being unable to prevent significant human damage. Relevant ministries and agencies, local governments, local residents, facility managers, and other related parties should cooperatively promote their efforts by properly combining structural and non-structural measures, such as countermeasures against landslides and sediment disasters, as well as seismic reinforcement work, drainage measures and countermeasures against liquefaction damage for significant facilities.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MAFF] Checking and diagnosis conducted for reservoirs: 40% (2013) → 100% (2020)

7-5) Large-scale spread and leakage of hazardous materials

  • The national and local governments should make joint efforts for preparing equipment and conducting drills for preventing large-scale spread and leakage of hazardous materials. Local governments are to develop their manuals to prevent health hazards and damage to the environment in preparation for any accident that may cause leakage or spread of hazardous materials.
  • In order to prevent leakage of high-pressure gas, etc., the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry should work on the revision of quake-resistance standards and the enhancement of the earthquake resistance of existing significant high-pressure gas facilities. At the same time, the Ministry should conduct stability analyses for mine waste dumps, from which hazardous materials may leak upon a large-scale earthquake or other disaster, and should promptly take required measures based on the results thereof.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[METI] Number of mine waste dumps where stability analyses have been conducted: 50% (2012) → 100% (2014)

7-6) Expansion of damage due to devastation of farmland and forests

  • The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries will encourage local communities’ efforts based on their independence and cooperative capacity for proper maintenance of farmland, agricultural water facilities and other resources in rural areas and for development of systems for voluntary disaster prevention and recovery activities.
  • Based on the results of the survey to ascertain locations with risks of mountain disasters, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries will facilitate initiatives for creating disaster-resilient forests through effective and efficient means, such as the maintenance of forests through proper thinning and comprehensive and effective soil conservation measures, while appropriately combining non-structural measures including the development of evacuation systems.
  • In order to ensure multifaceted functions of forests, forest conservation activities should be carried out in collaboration with local communities.
  • Forests are to be developed by utilizing local vegetation, while taking thorough measures against bird and animal damage, with the goal of creating diversified forests in symbiosis with nature.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MAFF] Managed forests that are categorized into forests maintaining watershed protection functions in municipal forest development plans, etc. and whose functions are well-preserved: 74% (2013) → 78% (2018)

[MAFF] Number of local communities where surrounding forests would properly fulfill their functions to prevent mountain disasters: 55,000 communities (2013) → 58,000 communities (2018) (mentioned above)

7-7) Tremendous influence on the national economy, etc. due to harmful rumors

  • With the aim of ensuring transmission of accurate information in and outside Japan upon the occurrence of a disaster, information to be transmitted depending on circumstances and transmission routes should be simulated in advance.
  • Regarding possible economic impact due to loss of jobs and declines in consumer confidence as a result of being hit by a disaster, proper responses to be taken must be discussed.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[FSA] Implementation of joint drills: 100% every fiscal year (mentioned above)

[FSA] Establishment of BCPs by financial institutions (regular members of the Japanese Bankers Association): Maintain their effectiveness (mentioned above)

8. Develop conditions that enable swift recovery and reconstruction of local society and economy even after the occurrence of a large-scale natural disaster.

8-1) Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to delay in treatment of a large amount of disaster waste

  • In accordance with estimated amount of disaster waste, securing stock yards should be promoted for provisional storage of disaster waste.
  • Private generators should be installed at waste incineration plants to enhance their disaster resilience.
  • Municipalities are to be encouraged to establish disaster waste disposal plans while making efforts for developing human resources through education with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the plans.
  • In order to prevent a secondary disaster due to disaster waste, disaster waste disposal plans should be prepared by incorporating information on hazardous materials and measures concerning disaster waste.
  • Discussions should be held on means for transporting disaster waste based on the characteristics of rail and maritime transportation (mass transportation), as well as on cooperation among local governments in accepting disaster waste.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MOE] Development of stock yards: 46% (2010) → 80% (2023)

[MOE] Waste incineration plants independently operable upon a disaster: 27% (2013) → 80% (2023)

[MOE] Establishment of disaster waste disposal plans (municipalities): 8% (2010) →80% (2023)

[MOE] Development of waste disposal technologies and educational programs (municipalities): 2% (2013) → 80% (2023)

[MOE] Implementation of surveys to ascertain hazardous materials: 21% (2010) → 100% (2018)

8-2) Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to shortage of personnel in charge of opening of access routes or other recovery/reconstruction-related activities (experts, coordinators, workers, engineers well versed in respective regions, etc.)

  • Cross-sectoral efforts should be made from the perspective of fostering personnel in charge of opening of access routes or other recovery/reconstruction-related activities (experts, coordinators, workers, engineers well versed in respective regions, etc.). Furthermore, with the aim of fostering and securing personnel in the construction industry who will engage in work for opening land routes in the event of a disaster, such as an earthquake, tsunami, sediment disaster or snow disaster, the working environment should be improved.
  • Measures should be taken to avoid a significant decline of functions of local administrative organs (including the police and fire services) due to injuries and damage to their personnel and facilities. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism should make further efforts to increase the personnel, materials and equipment of the TEC-FORCE in preparation for responding to requests from local governments for the dispatch of personnel in the event of a large-scale disaster.
  • Technologies utilizing ICT, such as introduction of information-oriented construction and disaster response robots at sites inaccessible by human beings, should be further developed and widely disseminated.

8-3) Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to collapse of local communities and a decline in public safety

  • Capabilities of communities should be enhanced to improve their response capacity in the event of a disaster. The national government will offer assistance for the creation of stronger communities through the preparation of hazard maps, drills and disaster prevention education, as well as through ensuring the sharing of best practices and research results, while encouraging relevant ministries and agencies and local governments to strengthen their collaboration.
  • Measures should be taken to avoid a significant decline of functions of local administrative organs (including the police and fire services) due to injuries and damage to their personnel and facilities.
  • With regard to police disaster relief units, efforts should be made for developing training facilities to improve their training levels, further enhancing the systems, newly installing and upgrading equipment and installing fueling facilities.
  • Seismic reinforcement work should be steadily carried out for police stations so that the police functions of respective local governments are fully ensured upon the occurrence of a Nankai Trough earthquake or other large-scale disaster.

8-4) Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to damage to the Shinkansen and other core infrastructure

  • Accuracy should be enhanced for damage to transport facilities envisaged to be caused by earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, etc., as well as for envisaged social and economic influences of a disruption of major transport networks.
  • Measures should be taken to strengthen disaster response capacity of traffic facilities (anti-seismic measures for roads, railroads, ports, airports and other traffic facilities). Furthermore, peripheral measures for protecting traffic facilities (flood control, soil conservation, coast protection and sediment control measures, such as by ascertaining risks of floods and sediment disasters, sharing information and carrying out research and studies) should also be promoted.
  • Measures to control demand in an emergency (a disruption of the core transport networks) should be discussed (ascertaining of the minimum required levels of passenger and freight flows, preparation of guidelines for companies’ facilities and deployment of personnel, etc.).
  • Relevant organizations should jointly carry out measures for ensuring smooth utilization of existing traffic networks in an emergency (consideration of alternate routes and dissemination and diffusion of related information, building of systems for securing maritime and air transport networks, etc.).
  • Multiple ministries and agencies should make cross-sectoral efforts in collaboration with local governments in preparation for circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to extensive damage to the core infrastructure.
  • In order to build multi-axis transport networks (securing collaboration and substitutability among different transport modes upon a disaster), expressway networks, including the Shin Tomei Expressway, and Shinkansen networks should be steadily developed.
  • PR activities should be carried out to have people broadly understand the importance of the national and local governments and private business operators jointly making preparations for a possible situation where the core transport networks become dysfunctional, and private business operators are to be encouraged to build their BCP and BCM structures in consideration of such situation.
  • The national government will offer assistance to local governments in conducting cadastral surveys and will prepare maps to be stored at registries for ensuring smooth implementation of disaster prevention projects and prompt recovery and reconstruction work in the event of a disaster. The national government will also actively promote preparation of cadastral maps through developing basic information on the boundaries between the public and private lands intensively in areas with a possibility of sustaining disaster damage.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Proportion of bridges with seismic resistance: 79% (2012) → 82% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT] Progress of cadastral surveys: 50% (2012) → 57% (2019)

8-5) Circumstances where recovery and reconstruction are delayed significantly due to extensive and prolonged flooding due to ground subsidence in broad areas

  • Basic geospatial information should be developed based on observation data using earth observatory satellites from normal times, and at the same time, preparation and publication of inland flood hazard maps should be promoted.
  • In order to ensure that highly accurate observation data using earth observatory satellites may be provided promptly and frequently to relevant organizations after the occurrence of a disaster, research and development should be furthered regarding data interpretation tools and training of personnel with advanced data interpretation skills.
  • Measures against flooding due to an earthquake, tsunami, flood, tidal wave, etc. should be steadily taken, while disaster mitigation measures should be promoted in watershed areas.

(Key Performance Indicators)

[MLIT] Municipalities that have prepared and publicized inland flood hazard maps and have conducted emergency drills: 31% (2012) → 100% (2016) (mentioned above)

[MLIT and MAFF] Completion ratio of the development of coastal dikes, etc. (construction of coastal dikes, etc. up to the planned height and seismic reinforcement work) in areas with a high possibility of being hit by a large-scale earthquake, such as a Tokai, Tonankai or Nankai earthquake: Approx. 31% (2012) → Approx. 66% (2016) (mentioned above)

Note 1) Current figures shown as key performance indicators are as ascertained as of the end of the fiscal year indicated in the parentheses.

Note 2) Targeted years indicated as “–” have yet to be determined at present.