

# **Interim Report**

(Main text)

*December 26, 2011*

Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear

Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

# **Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power**

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(In Japanese alphabetical order)

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## EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. Dates are for 2011 unless otherwise indicated.
2. Time is shown in 24-hour time.
3. Positions and titles are current at the time of events unless otherwise indicated.
4. What is referred to as “data and materials” in the text is compiled in the separate Attachment.
5. Abbreviations and English abbreviations are defined in the text with the tables of abbreviations and English abbreviations listed at the end of the separate Attachment.