

Final Report

(Main Text)

July 23, 2012

Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear

Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company

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Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power

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Note: The names of members and technical advisers are listed in the order of the Japanese alphabet. The members and technical advisers do not represent their affiliations in their roles with the Investigation Committee.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction	1
1. Overview of the Investigation Committee	1
2. Activities of the Investigation Committee	2
3. The Relationship between the Final Report and Interim Report	4
II. The Damage and Accident Responses at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS	7
1. The Damage at the Major Systems and Facilities of Units 1 to 3 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	7
(1) Introduction	7
(2) Major instrumentation mechanisms and related discussions	8
(3) Analyses on various phenomena concerning severe accidents	26
(4) Discussions on the damage to major Systems and Facilities of Unit 1	30
(5) Discussions on the damage to the major Systems and Facilities of Unit 2	35
(6) Discussions on the damage to the major Systems and Facilities of Unit 3	40
2. Examination of a Hydrogen Gas Explosion	45
(1) Types of explosions	45
(2) Characteristics of hydrogen gas explosions	47
(3) The explosion at the Unit 1 R/B	52
(4) The conditions at the Unit 2 R/B and S/C	70
(5) The explosion at the Unit 3 R/B	75
(6) Explosion at the Unit 4 R/B	82
3. Response to the Accidents at Units 5 and 6 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	96
(1) Overview of the response to the accidents at Units 5 and 6 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	96
(2) Overview of Units 5 and 6 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	96
(3) Extent of the damage to Units 5 and 6 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	98
(4) Situation from the moment of the earthquake until the arrival of the tsunami (between 14:46 and 15:35 on March 11)	101
(5) Situation concerning reactor depressurization and water injection into the reactor	104
(6) Status of the SFP up until the restoration of the RHR system and the response to this	115
(7) Situation from the restoration of the RHR system until the cold shutdown	118

4. Restoration of External Power to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	126
(1) Overview of the external power installations to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	126
(2) The damage to the external power installations to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	129
(3) Reviews and investigation regarding the restoration of external power to Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	129
(4) Restoration progress of external power to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	137
(5) Stabilization of external power to be supplied to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	143
5. Response to the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station	145
(1) Outline of the response to the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station	145
(2) Outline of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	146
(3) The damage at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	149
(4) Response from the occurrence of earthquakes to the arrival of tsunami (between approximately 14:46 on March 11 and approximately 15:22 on the same day)	154
(5) Response after the arrival of tsunami on March 11 (after approximately 15:22 on March 11)	160
(6) The conditions on March 12 and response	180
(7) Response on and after March 13	192
(8) Responses to the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS: The responses and comparison	196
 III. Emergency Responses Required and Taken by Governments and Other Bodies	215
1. Emergency Responses Mandated in the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, the Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness, etc.	215
2. Government Response after the Accident	215
(1) General description of the response of the national government	215
(2) Response of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency	225
(3) Response of the Emergency Operations Team at the Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister's Office	225
(4) Response of the NSC	225
(5) Response of other government-affiliated bodies, etc.	226
(6) Actions of nuclear safety inspectors responsible for inspections at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	229
3. Response Taken by Fukushima Prefectural Government after the Accident	229
4. TEPCO's Response after the Accident	229

(1) Initial response of TEPCO's head office and Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	229
(2) Establishment of the Integrated Headquarters for response to the incidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations	230
5. Response of the Offsite Center after the Accident	237
(1) Situation at the Offsite Center after the accident	237
(2) Offsite Center activities	238
(3) Relocation of the Offsite Center (Local NERHQ) to Fukushima prefectural government office	238
(4) Delegation of some authority from NERHQ director-general to local NERHQ director-general	239
IV. Emergency Response Measures Primarily Implemented outside the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station in Response to the Accident	243
1. Environmental Radiation Monitoring	243
(1) Preparedness for environmental radiation monitoring before the accident occurred and the initial situation regarding monitoring after the accident	243
(2) Efforts to assign responsibility for radiation monitoring and the subsequent enhancement of monitoring activities	244
2. Utilization and Dissemination of Information Yielded by SPEEDI	248
(1) Overview of the SPEEDI system	248
(2) Utilization and dissemination of information yielded by SPEEDI up to March 15	250
(3) Relationship between SPEEDI calculation results and evacuation measures concerning the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS accident	250
(4) Utilization and dissemination of information produced by SPEEDI from March 16 onward	258
3. Evacuation of Citizens	262
(1) Initial situation regarding the decision, instruction, communication and implementation of evacuation programs	262
(2) Evacuation from hospitals within a 20km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	268
(3) Decision, instruction, communication and implementation of long-term evacuation measures	278
(4) Evacuation in various municipalities	278
(5) Cancellation of areas prepared for emergency evacuation	279
(6) Declaration to lift the nuclear emergency state concerning the Fukushima Dai-ichi	

NPS	279
(7) Establishment of new evacuation areas	280
4. Measures Taken to Address the Risk of Radiation Exposure	284
(1) Radiation control standards	284
(2) Radiation dose limit for radiation workers in an emergency	284
(3) Organizational framework for radiation control at TEPCO	285
(4) Radiation dose limit for government employees in an emergency	295
(5) Radiation exposure of citizens	295
(6) Damage to radiation emergency medical facilities	300
5. Contamination of Agricultural, Livestock, Marine Products, the Air, Soil and Water	302
(1) Contamination of water, beverages and food, and the response taken	302
(2) Contamination of soil, etc.	311
(3) Contamination of seawater, pool water, etc.	315
(4) Measures taken to prevent the dispersal of contaminated material in the premises of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS	315
6. Occurrence and Treatment of Contaminated Water	316
(1) Details of responses to the contaminated water	316
(2) Clean-up of highly contaminated water	316
7. Estimates of the Total amount of Radioactive Materials Discharged and an Evaluation of INES levels	319
(1) Total amount of radioactive material discharged	319
(2) INES	320
8. Details of Events in Areas Where There may be Problems with the Provision of Information to the Public	320
(1) Institutional arrangements for the dissemination of information concerning the Fukushima nuclear accident	320
(2) Review of the changes in NISA’s remarks about reactor core conditions	322
(3) TEPCO’s remarks about reactor core conditions	327
(4) TEPCO’s public relations activities and the involvement of the Japanese government	327
(5) Dissemination of information about the Unit 3 reactor conditions	329
(6) Press conferences by the Integrated Headquarters	331
(7) Announcements concerning the detection of tellurium and other radionuclides	332
(8) Ambiguous expression of no “immediate” effects on health	332

(9) Contingency situation scenarios	333
9. Details of Events in Areas where there may be Problems Concerning the Provision of Information to the International Community	335
(1) Provision of information to various countries	335
(2) Provision of information concerning the discharge of contaminated water into the sea	340
10. Coordination with Other Countries and the IAEA	342
(1) Coordination with the U.S.	342
(2) Support from other countries and Japan's response to their support	342
(3) Evacuation advice of foreign governments to their nationals in Japan	345
(4) Coordination with the IAEA	347
V. Items to be Considered in Terms of Prevention of Accidents and Expansion of Damage	349
1. Safety Standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	349
2. Scientific Findings Concerning Earthquakes and Tsunami along the Japan Trench	355
(1) Opinions of seismologists concerning earthquakes and tsunami along the Japan Trench before the 2011 Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake	355
(2) Details leading to the exclusion of tsunami earthquakes suggested by the Long-term Evaluation from the discussion of disaster countermeasures at the Central Disaster Management Council	359
(3) Response to TEPCO's request to modify expressions upon the revision of the Long-term Evaluation	362
3. Countermeasures against severe accidents	362
(1) Technical level of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for accidents due to earthquakes	363
(2) The Background of the failure to include external events such as earthquakes in AM	367
(3) Station blackout (SBO)	378
4. Details of the Process of Discussion on the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System	387
(1) Discussion during the process of establishing the Act on the Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness	387
(2) The idea of the Emergency Preparedness Zone (EPZ)	389
(3) Response to a complex disaster of massive natural disaster and nuclear emergency	

combined	394
5. Relationship with International Convention and International Standards	396
(1) Approach to a harmonization of the international and national standards	396
(2) Review of regulatory bodies and nuclear operators by the IAEA and other organizations	401
6. Organizational Structure as Regulatory Bodies for Nuclear Safety	413
(1) NISA as a regulatory authority	413
(2) The NSC as an organization involved in regulation	419
VI. Wrap-up and Recommendations	423
Introduction	423
1. Analysis of Major Problems	425
(1) TEPCO responses to the accident and the damage to the plant	425
(2) Responses to the accident by the government and other bodies	429
(3) Measures to prevent the expansion of damage	439
(4) Accident preventive measures and emergency preparedness	464
(5) Nuclear safety regulatory bodies	468
(6) TEPCO competence	471
(7) Harmonization with international practices such as the IAEA safety standards	477
2. Recapitulation of Major Issues	478
(1) Building of fundamental and effective disaster preventive measures	478
(2) Lack of complex disaster point of view	481
(3) Change needed in an attitude to face risks	482
(4) Importance of “Deficiency analysis from the disaster victims’ standpoint”	485
(5) The issue of “beyond assumptions” and lack of the sense of crisis at the administrative bodies and TEPCO	491
(6) Issues of the government crisis management systems	497
(7) Issues of the provision of information and risk communication	499
(8) Importance of a safety culture vital to the lives of the public	501
(9) Necessity of continued investigation of the whole picture of accident causes and damage	504
3. Recommendations for Preventing Recurrences of Nuclear Disasters and for Mitigating Damages	508
(1) Recommendations for a basic stance for safety measures and emergency preparedness	509

(2) Recommendations for safety measures regarding nuclear power generation	511
(3) Recommendations for nuclear emergency response systems	512
(4) Recommendations for damage prevention and mitigation	513
(5) Recommendations for harmonization with international practices	516
(6) Recommendations for relevant organizations	517
(7) Recommendations for continued investigation of accident causes and damage	520
Chairperson's Remarks	522

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EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. Dates are for 2011 unless otherwise indicated.
2. Time is shown in 24-hour time.
3. Positions and titles are current at the time of events unless otherwise indicated.
4. What is referred to as “data and materials” in the text is compiled in the separate Attachment.
5. Abbreviations and English abbreviations are defined in the text with the tables of abbreviations and English abbreviations listed at the end of the separate Attachment.

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