

Understanding and Perceptions of the Takeshima Issue of the Various Embassies Located in Japan

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Introduction

Takashi Tsukamoto made clear that under the “Treaty of Peace with Japan” (the San Francisco Peace Treaty; the “Peace Treaty”) Takeshima was treated as part of Japanese territory in his paper “Column: The Treatment of Takeshima in the Treaty of Peace with Japan,” which was posted on this website on January 29, 2021. Regardless of such treatment of Takeshima under the treaty, the Republic of Korea (ROK) illegally occupied Takeshima. This paper examines the views and perceptions of the various third-country embassies located in Japan regarding this issue.

1 Report submitted to the United States by Acting U.S. Political Advisor for Japan William J. Sebald

On January 18, 1952, the ROK government issued the “Syngman Rhee Line Declaration” (official name: “Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over Adjacent Seas”) with which it asserted its fisheries jurisdiction (exclusive rights that coastal states control fisheries) and sovereignty over a large maritime area around the Korean peninsula. On January 28 the Japanese government issued a protest against the declaration, and this marked the start of the Takeshima issue, as this Syngman Rhee Line encompassed the island within its easternmost boundary. On February 12, the ROK government issued a rebuttal to Japan’s protest, and on April 25, the government of Japan issued counterarguments to the rebuttal.

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William Joseph Sebald (1901-1980), the Acting U.S. Political Advisor for Japan (a position equivalent to ambassador, as Japan had not yet regained its independence at the time and the position of ambassador did not yet exist) sent a report to the U.S. State Department dated January 29, 1952.¹ At the time Sebald was serving concurrently as Chief of the Diplomatic Section of the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP; “GHQ”), which was responsible for the administration of Japan.

In Part I of the report Sebald introduced the text of the protest² issued by the government of Japan on the previous day, and in Part IV he stated the following:

Korean inclusion Takeshima within Rhee Line poses question sovereignty these islands. Japs have been deprived of govt and admin jurisdiction these islands by SCAPIN. However, by exclusion, terms of Peace Treaty appear reserve sovereignty to Japan. Presumably this is proper subject for negotiation between Japan and Korea without reference SCAP or Allied Powers.

SCAPIN referred to in this comment is the SCAP Instruction Note 677 (SCAPIN-677)³ that was issued on January 29, 1946. This directive removed Takeshima, together with Jeju and Utsuryo Islands from areas under Japanese administration. However, the directive also noted that that “nothing in this

1 1950-52: 322.2 Boundary Waters (NARA, RG84 Records of Office of the U. S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo Box No. 64, Folder No. 8). The original documents are in the collection of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of the United States. “Records of Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Records of Japan, Tokyo Consulate General and Records of Office of the U. S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo,” are in the collection of the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library, Japan, call No. FSP 0337.

2 “A note verbale of protest from the Government of Japan to the Government of the ROK on January 28, 1952, in response to a declaration concerning maritime sovereignty by the President of the ROK, Syngman Rhee,” (Takeshima Archives Portal/Takeshima Archive Portal, <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo/shiryo/takeshima/index.html>, Document No. T1952012800101)

3 “Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan (SCAPIN-677),” (Takeshima Archives Portal/Takeshima Archive Portal, T1946012900101).

directive shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of” Japanese territory. The ultimate decision over Japanese territory was made in the Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951.

What should be noted in Sebald’s report is the phrase, “by exclusion, terms of the Peace Treaty appear to reserve sovereignty to Japan.” The words “by exclusion” likely refer to the fact that whereas SCAPIN-677 excludes “Utsuryo (Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island” from the scope of what is considered to be Japan, Article 2 (a) of the Peace Treaty states that “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the Islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet,” and Takeshima is thus not referred to at all in the Peace Treaty.

In November 1949, seeing that the U.S. State Department’s draft Peace Treaty attributed “Quelpart (Saishu To), the Nan How Group (San To, or Komun Do) which forms Port Hamilton (Tonaikai), Dagelet Island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu Shima), Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima)” to Korea, Sebald wrote to the Secretary of State, noting that with regard to Takeshima, “Japan’s claim to these islands is old and appears valid,” and requested that the State Department revise its draft of the treaty.⁴ Sebald’s opinions were accepted and in the draft Peace Treaty compiled in December 1949, the text was modified to include Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks) as part of the territory of Japan. Subsequently the paragraph noting which islands were part of Japanese territory was dropped from the draft version, but there was no change to the U.S. policy that Takeshima would remain as part of Japan’s territory. In August 1951, an official document from the U.S. Government (the “Rusk Letter”) stated that Takeshima had been under the jurisdiction of Japan local government and rejected the ROK government’s claims to include Takeshima as part of Korea, which would be renounced by Japan. It can be seen from his report that Sebald was unaware of the ROK request and the Rusk Letter. Nonetheless, it was Sebald’s view that in the Peace Treaty, Takeshima should remain as part of Japan.

The ROK has criticized that in the background of Sebald’s request to revise the treaty draft in November, 1949, these were cunning actions by the Japanese government. The ROK stated that, “Upon the insistence of the Japanese government, however, United States Department of State officials wrote in a draft that the island was part of Japan” (Chapter III “Korea’s Territorial

Rights to Dokdo Seen from Measures Taken by the Allied Powers after World War II,” in *Dokdo is Korean Territory* (on the website of the Northeast Asian History Network)⁵). In referring to the “insistence of the Japanese government” the ROK is most likely seeking to imply that the Japanese government used Sebald to influence the U.S. State Department. The reality was different, however. While the State Department likely considered the opinion of Sebald, it was the department that decided, based on their own information and judgement that Takeshima would remain as a part of Japan in the Peace Treaty. Sebald’s report on January 29, 1952 reveals such fact by showing his lack of awareness of the interactions between the ROK and US in relation to Takeshima in 1951.

Letters from July 1951 with respect to the ROK government’s request to the U.S. government to include Takeshima as part of Korean territory in the Peace Treaty (a letter sent from ROK Foreign Minister Yung Tai Pyun to U.S. Ambassador to the ROK John J. Muccio on July 17, and a letter from ROK Ambassador to the U.S. You Chan Yang to Special Advisor John F. Dulles on July 19)⁶ were also sent to the office of the U.S. Political Advisor for Japan. In addition, a report to the State Department⁷ from the U.S. Ambassador to the ROK dated November 28, 1951, which summarized Korean newspaper reports condemning the landing on Takeshima by the crew of the training ship “Asanagi-Maru” of Sakai High School in Tottori Prefecture, was similarly sent to the office of the U.S. Political Advisor for Japan. In that report it was noted that “It will be recalled Tok Island was 1 of those ROK Government asked be specifically mentioned as Korean in Article II Japanese Peace Treaty.” The absence of references to these pieces of information in Sebald’s report on January 29, 1952 would suggest that he had little interest in Takeshima before the Takeshima issue emerged following the declaration of the Syngman Rhee Line. In other words, other than his request to the State Department in 1949, Sebald took no further action over Takeshima, which tells us that he was not subject to the “insistence of the Japanese government.”

2 Report to London of the British Embassy in Japan

On May 28, 1953, the crew of the “Shimane-Maru,” a research vessel of the Shimane Prefecture Fisheries Research Institute, confirmed the activities of Korean people on

4 Tsukamoto Takashi, “Heiwa Joyaku to Takeshima (Sairon)” (The Peace Treaty and Takeshima, Revisited), The Reference, No. 518, Research and Legislative Reference Bureau, National Diet Library, Japan, March 1994, pp. 41-43.

5 http://contents.nahf.or.kr/japanese/item/level.do?levelId=isd_k_j_0001_0030_0020
First noted in “2008.7.” Last viewed on October 3, 2023.

6 1950-52: 320.2 Peace Treaty, June-July 1951 (NARA, RG84 Records of Office of the U. S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, Box No. 62, Folder No.1). The original documents are in the collection of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of the United States. “Records of Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Records of Japan, Tokyo Consulate General and Records of Office of the U. S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo” are in the collection of the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library, Japan, call No. FSP 3781.

7 1950-52: 322 Territory (NARA, RG84 Records of Office of the U. S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, Box No.7 Folder No.10). Original documents in the collection of NARA. “Records of Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Records of Japan, Tokyo Consulate General and Records of Office of the U. S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo” are in the collection of the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library, Japan, call No. FSP 0560.

Takeshima.⁸ On June 27 the same year, Shimane Prefecture and the Maritime Safety Agency conducted a joint survey of Takeshima, calling for the Koreans who had landed there to leave, and establishing signs denoting Takeshima as Japanese territory.⁹ The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, which opposed Japan's survey of Takeshima as an "incident of invasion of Dokdo," on July 8 urged the ROK government to take a hardline stance against Japan. On July 12 an incident occurred in which a patrol vessel of the Maritime Safety Agency in the vicinity of Takeshima was fired on.¹⁰ The next day, July 13, the Japanese government issued a protest about the firing incident and also issued a note verbale to the ROK government in which it conveyed Japan's views over the Takeshima issue. During August there were two further exchanges of protests, and on September 9 the ROK government issued its own note verbale, rebutting the views expressed by the Japanese government.

In the report sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Embassy in Japan dated July 1, 1953, concerning the Takeshima issue,¹¹ it is stated that, "We have been unable to discover from published sources details of Japan's historical claim to the island but it appears to have been discovered by some Japanese travellers at the beginning of the eighteenth century who were on their way to the island of Utsuryoto." It is also noted that, "There seems, however, to have been some confusion about the names given to the islands of Takeshima and Utsuryoto and the name Matsushima is also used for Takeshima." As evidenced by the erroneous use of "18th century" instead of "17th century," the British Embassy was unaware of the historical basis for the use, etc., of Takeshima during the Edo period, as well as the details of the change to the island's name when Takeshima was incorporated into Shimane Prefecture in 1905. However, it is apparent that the British Embassy had engaged in the collection of information concerning the Takeshima issue. There is also an article in the *Asahi Shimbun* (*Shimane Edition*) dated July 5, titled, "Tokyo Office (of Shimane Prefecture) receives inquiry about the attribution of territory."

The report sent to the British Foreign Office by the British

Embassy in Japan dated July 15, 1953, concerning the Takeshima issue¹² begins with an explanation of the incident in which a patrol vessel had been fired on several days earlier, on July 12. The next paragraph provides an explanation about the protest by the Japanese government concerning this incident, and the government's assertions concerning sovereignty. The explanation was the same as the following opinions asserted by the Japanese government two days earlier, on July 13.¹³

More than half of the views expressed by the Japanese government dealt with the post-war handling of Takeshima. This is due to the fact in its rebuttal of February 12, 1952, the ROK government relied solely on SCAPIN-677 and SCAPIN-1033 as the basis for its claim of sovereignty. SCAPIN-1033¹⁴ is a directive, dated June 22, 1946, in which GHQ revised the operating limit line for Japanese fishing vessels (the so-called MacArthur Line) and prohibited Japanese nationals from approaching or contacting Takeshima. The Japanese government pointed out that in both SCAPIN-677 and SCAPIN-1033 explicitly stated that the directives themselves do not seek to express allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, and also asserted that Takeshima was designated as a bombing range by U.S. Forces based on the premise that Takeshima was Japanese territory.

The July 15 report of the British Embassy also explains to the British Foreign Office how it had been reported in the evening edition of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* on July 14 that the U.S. and British governments may be requested to act as mediators in order to realize a peaceful solution to the Takeshima issue.¹⁵ The report goes on to note that although no such request had yet been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, it seemed quite possible that such a request may be made in the near future, and that the embassy would immediately inform the British Foreign Office in such an event. What is important is the final paragraph of the report.

5. Meanwhile you may wish to be considering what should be our attitude. If required to mediate we should of course have to ask both sides to present their case; but our preliminary

8 For related newspaper articles about this incident, see *Mainichi Shimbun* (Osaka), May 31, 1953, "Koreans land on 'Takeshima'," (Takeshima Archive Portal, Document No. T1953053100102), and *Mainichi Shimbun* (Shimane), June 4, 1953, "Do the 'Korean fishing vessels on Takeshima' constitute a territorial invasion? Interview with Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kodaki about strong protests following investigation," (Takeshima Archive Portal, Document No. T1953060400102).

9 "'Mission Report' on the Joint Survey in Takeshima conducted by Shimane Prefecture and the Maritime Safety Agency," (Takeshima Archive Portal, Document No. T1953062800103).

10 For related newspaper articles, see *San'in Shimpō*, July 14, 1953, "Patrol boat fired on near Takeshima," (Takeshima Archive Portal, Document No. T1953071400202).

11 Japanese claim to Takeshima Island, also claimed by the Republic of Korea (TNA, FO371/105378, Code FJ file 1082). The original documents are in the collection of The National Archives (United Kingdom). "British Foreign Office Files for Post-War Japan, Parts 1-8: Complete Files for 1952-1974" are also in the collection of the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library, Japan call No. BFO-2.

12 TNA document, *supra* note 11. "Commissioned Research Report on the Takeshima-related Documents, FY2017 Cabinet Secretariat Commissioned Research Project," (Streamgraph, Inc., March 2018), pp. 36-37.

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau), "Press cuttings," in the collection of Shimane Prefectural Library.

14 "On the Matter of the Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling (SCAPIN-1033)," (Takeshima Archive Portal, Document No. T1946062200101).

15 Cabinet Secretariat document, *supra* note 12, "Commissioned Research Report on the Takeshima-related Documents, FY2017 Cabinet Secretariat Commissioned Research Project," p. 38.

view is that under Article 2 of the Peace Treaty, of which we are co-signatories, Takeshima unmistakably forms part of Japanese territory.

Thus, the recognition of the British Embassy, albeit a “preliminary view,” was that “Takeshima unmistakably forms part of Japanese territory.” This is also thought to have been a view taken to reflect the stance of the Japanese government.

The Japanese government was of the same view and made the following assertions with regard to the stipulations of Article 2 (a) of the Peace Treaty, which states, “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet”. The government stated that Takeshima, “had been placed under the jurisdiction of Shimane Prefecture prior to the annexation of Korea to Japan, and continued to be so even after the annexation, not having been placed under the jurisdiction of the Government-General of Korea.” It would therefore have been impossible to cede Takeshima, which was Japanese territory, even recognizing the “independence of Korea” as referred to in Article 2 (a). The listing of “Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet” in Article 2 (a) was inserted for the “intended to confirm” that these three islands were part of an “independent Korea,” and it is therefore only natural that Takeshima, which is Japanese territory, was not included.

That the author of the report at the British Embassy did not use vague wording such as “it appears,” “it seems,” or “the texts indicate,” but rather chose the strong expression “unmistakably,” demonstrates support for Japan’s territorial claims. With only SCAPIN-677 and SCAPIN-1033 as the basis for the ROK’s territorial claims, and with these unequivocally rejected by the Japanese government, it was a reasonable assessment.

3 Document compiled by the New Zealand Embassy in Japan

On May 3, 1954, under the guard of five patrol vessels, members of Kumi Fishery Cooperative Association on Oki Island sailed out to Takeshima on the Shimane Prefecture fisheries inspection vessel “Shimakaze,” and exercised their fishery rights at the coastal reef zone by gathering seaweed, abalone, turban shell, etc., there. On May 27, the vessel “Shimane-Maru” sailed close to Takeshima, and on May 30 so too did “Daisen,” the research vessel of Tottori Prefecture Fisheries Research Institute. Perhaps in response to these developments, on June 11 of the same year, the ROK government dispatched the South Korean Coast Guard to Takeshima, and on September 2, it decided to

station Coast Guard personnel on the island.¹⁶ On August 27, the Japanese government issued a protest about the erection of a lighthouse on Takeshima. Also in 1954, on August 23 a Japanese patrol vessel was fired on and on November 21 shells were also fired on patrol vessels. This was also the year in which Japan and the ROK sent each other their respective views on the basis for their territorial sovereignty over Takeshima – the Japanese government sending their views on February 10, with the ROK government doing likewise on September 25. Like the first exchange of views the previous year, the second exchange of views took the form of a rebuttal by the ROK government of the Japanese government’s claims. On September 25, the Japanese government proposed to refer the dispute over Takeshima to the International Court of Justice, a proposal that was rejected by the ROK government on October 28.

Tensions remained high between Japan and the ROK during 1955. Since September 1953 the situation in the East China Sea had worsened, with the ROK repeatedly capturing Japanese fishing vessels. Since July 1954 the ROK government had refused to allow crew members of Japanese fishing vessels captured under the pretext of violating the Syngman Rhee Line to return home after serving their sentences as stipulated by the Fishery Resources Protection Act. The Japanese crew members suffered from poor food and various hardships, enduring detention in the prison camp for foreigners in Busan. The Japanese government sought a negotiated settlement, but on August 17, 1955, the ROK government announced a ban on ROK nationals visiting Japan and a total suspension of trade with Japan. On November 17, the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a policy of firing on and, if necessary, sinking Japanese fishing vessels. Japanese fishing-related authorities protested this announcement and organized gatherings around the country, calling on the government to take countermeasures.

There is a six-page document titled “Japanes-Korean Relations” in the National Archives of New Zealand (Archives New Zealand (ANZ)), thought to have been compiled by the New Zealand Embassy in Japan, with a hand-written date of October 31, 1955.¹⁷ It was most likely made in response to the intensifying confrontation between Japan and the ROK as set out above. The third part of the document, titled “The Takeshima Question,” is duplicated below in its entirety.

Over three years have already passed since the Korean Government began laying claim to the island of Takeshima, which is undeniably Japanese territory. During this period the Japanese Government lodged strong protests with the Korean Government each time it discovered an illegal act committed by the Korean side, such as intrusions into the

16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, ed., *Ten Years of Foreign Affairs Administration*, (May 1959), p. 513, National Institute of Korean History, ed., *Chronology of the History of the Republic of Korea*, (October 1984), p. 295, p. 303.

17 Individual Countries - Japan - External Relations - Korea (ANZ, Item Code: R22230074). This document was discovered by the author (Fujii) at Archives New Zealand (ANZ), where he conducted research at the request of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). See Fujii, K. “Takeshima mondai ni kansuru nyūjirando seifu gaimushō no chōsho ni tsuite” [“Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand concerning the Takeshima issue”], (posted on JIIA website July 24, 2023). <https://www.jiia.or.jp/jic/20230724-01.html>

island. It was also pointed out to them a number of times that Takeshima is clearly Japanese territory from the stand-point of history as well as of international law.

The Korean side sent back a letter of rebuttal, but it did not contain anything that could shake the validity of the Japanese Government's assertion.

In July of last year the Korean Government were so bold as to take control of Takeshima by force and station a patrol on the island. It constructed a lighthouse and set up telegraph poles. Aside from firing on a Japanese patrol boat which went to make an on-the-spot investigation, the Korean Government also issued a stamp bearing a picture of the island, with the aim of propagandizing Korea's claim to Takeshima both at home and abroad.

The Japanese Government has never once failed to protest against these illegal and unjust acts, but in order to achieve a peaceful and decisive solution to the dispute, Japan decided to submit the Takeshima question to the International Court of Justice. On September 25, 1954, Japan advanced this proposal to the Korean Government and requested its agreement. The proposal was, however, rejected by the Korean Government on October 28. It is a matter for deep regret that the Korean Government shunned this opportunity to clarify its position before the World Court and to obtain a fair judgement.

Since then the Korean Government has not altered its attitude toward the occupation of Takeshima by force. The Japanese Government will, of course, protest this, but it is its intention to do its utmost for a peaceful settlement of the question.

This text is premised on the legitimacy of Japan's claims to sovereignty of Takeshima. It also positively evaluates the Japanese government's policy of seeking a peaceful settlement concerning Takeshima and criticizes the ROK government's rejection of such a solution. What should be noted above all is that it totally rejects the ROK's claims about the basis for the ROK's sovereignty over Takeshima, noting that, "It did not contain anything that could shake the validity of the Japanese Government's assertion."

A key issue in the exchange of views between the Japanese and ROK governments was whether there was any evidence that the government on the Korean peninsula had governed Takeshima prior to Shimane Prefecture's incorporation of Takeshima in 1905. In order to rebut the assertion made in the Japanese government's first submission of views that Takeshima was Japanese territory when administration of Takeshima began, the ROK government asserted in both their first and second

submission of views that the incorporation of Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture in 1905 was an act of aggression.¹⁸ As the basis for this view, the ROK government cites (a) the report of the Ulido magistrate Sim Heung-taek of 1906, (b) the fact that Nakai Yozaburo, who petitioned the government of Japan to lease Takeshima to him in 1904, thought that Takeshima was Korean territory, (c) the details contained in the publication by Hibata Sekko, "On Japan-Korea Relations Over Takeshima in the Sea of Japan," (*History and Geography*, Vol. 55-6, The Association of Historical Geography in Japan, June 1930), (d) the fact that in *Hydrographic Directory of Korean Coastal Waters Vol. 1*, published by the Hydrographic Department (January 1933), there is an explanation about Takeshima in the paragraph concerning the "eastern coast of Korea," and (e) the same document contains records of the activities of the people of Utsuryo Island (Ulleungdo) on Takeshima.

None of these points present any kind of evidence that the government on the Korean peninsula at the time governed Takeshima. In its second submission of views the Japanese government rebutted all of these assertions and in its third submission of views¹⁹ in 1956, it rejected the ROK government's claims in their entirety, noting that, "Inasmuch as the Korean side is unable to produce positive evidences of its effective administration of Takeshima, it appears that the Korean side is trying to assert, by quoting Japanese literatures, that the island was a part of the Korean territory at about the time of its incorporation into Shimane Prefecture. However, such quotations do not serve as direct evidence for establishing Korean ownership of Takeshima, nor are they are valuable even as a evidence, because Korea has interpreted the literatures in such a way as to suit her own convenience and confused the present Takeshima with Ulneungdo." There is no mistaking that the official at the New Zealand Embassy was also entirely in agreement with Japan after reading the views presented by the ROK government.

It is possible that the reason the New Zealand Embassy official determined that "Takeshima is undeniably Japanese territory" was due to a memo made by the New Zealand Department of External Affairs (NZDEA) and dated December 2, 1953, titled, "Japan-Korea Relations with Special Reference to the Dispute Concerning Takeshima Island." This memo, which NZDEA sent to the New Zealand Embassy in Japan on December 7, 1953, noted that in July 1951 the ROK government requested the support of the Australian government in calling for revisions to the draft Peace Treaty that would identify Takeshima as ROK territory. However, the same memo also made clear that under the Peace Treaty Takeshima remained Japanese territory, noting that "...the peace treaty was finally signed without amendment of Article 2 (a) in the sense desired by South Korea."

18 The two views are recorded in the publication edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, *Collections of Dokdo-related Materials (I): The Diplomatic Correspondence (1952-76)*, (July 1977).

19 Recorded in the documents collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK), *supra* note 18.

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Conclusion

The views on the Takeshima issue of three embassies in Japan of the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand that have been set out and considered above were all based on the recognition that under the terms of the Peace Treaty, Takeshima remained Japanese territory. Of course, a report from a diplomatic mission overseas to the home country is only a report, and what is written therein may not necessarily constitute the view of the home government. In addition, as Sebald finally noted, “Presumably this is proper subject for negotiation between Japan and Korea without reference SCAP or Allied Powers,” it was generally recognized as not being in any nation’s interest to intervene in the territorial issues of another country, and any recognition of Takeshima as Japanese territory would not necessarily lead to any action to halt the ROK’s illegal occupation of Takeshima.

Even so, it would appear to be the case that Sebald arrived at his recognition on Takeshima from the wording of the Peace Treaty, and that the British and New Zealand embassies arrived at a similar recognition after having considered the various claims of the Japanese and ROK governments. The value of these documents lies in the very fact that they provide an objective judgment on the Takeshima issue from a perspective other than that of Japan or the ROK.